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China-Like Social-Credit Systems, AI-Enabled Command Networks, and the Use of Civilian Infrastructure for Covert Disruption(Act of destroction)
Executive Summary
This memorandum presents a concern that systems resembling China’s social-credit and surveillance architecture may have been distributed, adapted, or replicated outside China through unofficial channels, including sect-like groups, informal community networks, and compromised digital infrastructure.
The central concern is that such systems may combine IP-linked devices, surveillance cameras, Wi-Fi environments, operating-system geolocation functions, background software implants, ATM infrastructure, convenience-store monitoring, and platform-based messaging systems to identify, track, and influence the movement of individuals in near real time.
The reported pattern suggests that what may have initially been introduced under the appearance of public safety, anti-crime coordination, or community monitoring may, in practice, function as an AI-assisted command-and-control system. Even where direct human command is not visible, AI-generated instructions delivered through messaging platforms may still constitute a command structure when they guide coordinated activity, surveillance, obstruction, harassment, traffic disruption, or other forms of destructive activity.
Key Analytical Point
A system does not cease to be a command structure merely because the instructions are distributed by AI or through civilian messaging platforms.
If individuals receive tasking through WhatsApp, LINE, WeChat, or similar platforms, and if those instructions cause coordinated movement, surveillance, intimidation, obstruction, or disruption, then the activity may be treated as organized command activity.
Where such activity affects public roads, civilian movement, family life, infrastructure, commercial activity, or personal security, it may constitute a new category of non-traditional sabotage or hostile civil-domain operation.
Reported Field Observation: Possible Hand-Delivered Access to Command Threads
One observed incident involved a man perceived as Chinese communicating with another resident who also appeared to the reporting individual to be Chinese. The man was riding an unfamiliar bicycle and appeared to receive instructions or access information in person. He reportedly responded with phrases such as “yes, yes” and “OK, OK” before departing.
The man wore a striped T-shirt. When he made eye contact with the reporting individual, he appeared briefly frightened.
The significance of this incident is not the ethnicity of the individual alone, but the possibility that access to specific message threads, AI-directed instruction channels, or operational communication groups may be handed over physically rather than digitally. Such a method would reduce the visibility of recruitment, tasking, and command-chain transmission.
If true, this would suggest that certain civilian-facing platforms may be used as low-friction command infrastructure.
Possible Technical Architecture
The suspected model can be described as follows:
Initial justification:
The system may first be distributed under the appearance of crime prevention, neighborhood watch, public safety, or local coordination.Device and location layer:
It may rely on geolocation functions already present in Windows, mobile operating systems, Wi-Fi systems, mapping services, and other endpoint infrastructure.Surveillance layer:
It may exploit or correlate data from CCTV, ATMs, convenience stores, public cameras, Wi-Fi networks, pos sytem,and other IP-linked devices.Background implant layer:
Unauthorized software or remote configuration may be used to alter device behavior or identify persons of interest.Messaging command layer:
Instructions may be sent through ordinary platforms such as WhatsApp, LINE, WeChat, or similar systems.Human execution layer:
Local actors may respond to AI or platform-based instructions by moving vehicles, appearing in public areas, observing a target, delaying traffic, or creating coordinated pressure.
In this model, the system does not require every participant to understand the full architecture. Many may only receive simple instructions, such as where to go, when to move, where to stop, whom to observe, or how to behave.
Analogy: Online Game Modification and Remote Behavioral Control
A useful technical analogy is the “Mod Menu” used in online games.
In online game environments, a user may launch a lightweight desktop tool that connects to an intermediary server controlled by a third party. Through that server, behavior inside the online session can be altered. Examples include invulnerability, teleportation, asset modification, or altered movement.
The core concept is not the game itself. The core concept is that a third-party intermediary server can interfere with a live networked environment and modify behavior inside that environment.
The concern is that a similar concept may have been scaled into real-world infrastructure:
a third-party server or server network may sit between ordinary devices, cloud systems, IP-linked infrastructure, and user-facing services, enabling unauthorized remote coordination or manipulation.
If such a model were combined with surveillance data, messaging systems, and AI-generated tasking, it could become a civilian-domain command system.
Scale and Feasibility Concern
The concern is strengthened by the scale of available engineering manpower.
A highly detailed digital city such as Grand Theft Auto V was reportedly built by a large development workforce over several years, creating a complex simulated urban environment of vehicles, pedestrians, roads, behaviors, and systems.
If hundreds of thousands of engineers, programmers, or system specialists were redirected into surveillance, AI coordination, network interception, or device-level monitoring, the manpower requirement for broad infrastructure manipulation may no longer be unrealistic.
The question is therefore not whether every device is manually controlled. The question is whether enough devices, cameras, platforms, and network points can be correlated and influenced to generate targeted real-world effects.
Traffic Disruption as a Form of Civilian-Domain Sabotage
One of the most serious reported patterns is destructive traffic disruption.
The reporting individual describes incidents in which a short trip that should normally take approximately 15 minutes became a three-hour return journey due to sudden, localized, highly unusual congestion. The relevant area included Japan’s National Route 1 and a location named Harajuku Crossing, which shares its name with Tokyo’s well-known Harajuku area.
The analytical concern is that automated systems, bot networks, keyword scanning, geolocation confusion, and Chinese-language network traffic may create false or deliberate routing effects. If a system detects references to “Harajuku” and China-related content, it may direct traffic or coordinated movement toward the wrong Harajuku location, causing local congestion and disruption.
Even if this is only a partial explanation, the broader concern remains:
localized congestion can be weaponized.
Traffic congestion can:
delay workers returning home;
increase driver fatigue;
damage family communication time;
increase stress within households;
wear down roads and infrastructure;
obstruct emergency mobility;
create long-term social and economic damage.
A father who should return home at 7:30 p.m. may instead return at 8:30 or 9:00 p.m. Over months or years, this reduces family time, increases exhaustion, and damages household stability.
In this sense, traffic manipulation may operate as slow, low-visibility infrastructure warfare.
Historical Pattern: Manual Traffic Disruption Before AI
The concern is not limited to modern AI systems.
The reporting individual recalls earlier experiences from childhood in which mountain roads, camp roads, and fishing-route roads became unusually congested in ways that appeared intentional. The reporting individual also recalls being stared at by drivers even when visibility into the vehicle should have been limited due to reflections, glass, and the individual’s low height as a child.
This suggests that manual traffic disruption, group movement, and target recognition may have existed before modern AI systems. AI may therefore be an acceleration layer placed on top of an older human-command structure.
Vehicle Mobilization and Coordinated Road Behavior
Another reported incident involved a person who invited the reporting individual to the seaside by motorcycle. During the trip, the person reportedly stopped frequently and appeared to communicate with others.
On the return journey, the rider allegedly crossed the center line in a direct and dangerous manner despite visible vehicles moving left and right at distances of approximately 100 to 400 meters. The reporting individual interpreted this as a pre-coordinated movement based on confidence that the surrounding vehicles were part of the same external activity and would not change lanes unpredictably.
The analytical point is that this may represent a form of coordinated vehicle mobilization. In such a model, traffic behavior is not random. Vehicles become instruments in a controlled operating field.
This should be examined as a possible new category of organized road-based sabotage or intimidation.
Vehicle Theft, Insurance Abuse, and Sect-Like Criminal Economy
The reporting individual also describes a pattern from the late 1990s involving young individuals whose vehicles were allegedly stolen, yet who showed no normal emotional reaction. They reportedly stated that insurance would cover the loss.
The concern is that vehicle theft may have been normalized inside certain sect-like or criminal networks because:
stolen parts could be recovered or redistributed;
stolen vehicles or components could be sold to affiliated groups;
insurance payouts could recover costs;
the theft itself could serve a coordinated economic function.
This would represent a more serious category of fraud and organized criminal behavior than ordinary juvenile delinquency.
Low-Level Retaliation as a Serious Signal
The reporting individual describes signs of possible trespass and retaliation, including the placement of objects such as potato chips on a vehicle. Such actions may appear trivial to ordinary police response systems.
However, the argument presented here is that international investigative agencies should treat such incidents differently when they appear within a broader pattern of organized surveillance, trespass, vehicle interference, harassment, or sect-like retaliation.
A minor act may function as a signal, a warning, a proof of access, or a message of control.
Concern Regarding Local Police Limitations
The memorandum also raises concern that local police may conduct only minimal or formalistic responses, especially where corruption, institutional pressure, political sensitivity, or foreign-linked community pressure is present.
The reporting individual believes that some police agencies may perform enough visible activity to avoid appearing completely inactive, while still failing to address the underlying command structure.
This creates an enforcement gap:
international or national-level hostile activity may occur in forms that remain too ambiguous or too localized for ordinary police systems to handle properly.
Command Structure and Non-Standard Actors
A later reported incident involved a vehicle with an unusual license number pattern, such as repeated digits. The vehicle was described as an older white luxury sedan, heavily polished, lowered, with dark tinted rear glass.
The driver was reportedly around 65 years old, poorly dressed, and did not visually match the disciplined appearance often associated with sect-like actors. When challenged, he allegedly avoided identifying any affiliation and physically reacted with involuntary fear when asked whether he belonged to a communist or cult-related group.
The reporting individual assessed that the driver may not have been an ordinary sect participant. Instead, he may have been part of a semi-command layer: an older, locally embedded actor who can interact with sect-like groups while retaining greater autonomy, judgment, and crisis-management ability.
This distinction matters.
A sect participant may act by pattern.
A semi-command actor may choose words, assess risk, de-escalate danger, and redirect the situation.
Possible Historical Layer: Postwar Anti-State Networks
The memorandum further proposes a historical hypothesis: that some local command elements may derive not directly from contemporary China, but from postwar anti-state networks connected to former Japanese military or related families, including groups shaped by Soviet detention, postwar ideological reversal, or long-term resentment toward the Japanese state.
Under this hypothesis, certain actors may have trained their children or successors into anti-state, sect-controlling, or covert social-control roles. These networks may later have aligned with Chinese actors, mixed communities, or foreign strategic interests.
This would mean that the visible sect layer is not the true center of command.
The visible actors may be controlled by a semi-command layer embedded locally over generations.
Strategic Assessment
The reported pattern suggests the possible existence of a layered system:
Central or foreign strategic layer
Possible China-linked or broader hostile-state influence.Technical infrastructure layer
Unauthorized servers, compromised devices, IP-linked surveillance, platform command threads, AI routing, and data correlation.Semi-command local layer
Older or autonomous actors embedded within local society, capable of directing or influencing sect-like groups.Sect-like execution layer
Individuals who perform observation, movement, signaling, harassment, traffic participation, or low-level retaliation.Civilian camouflage layer
Activity is disguised as ordinary traffic, ordinary residents, ordinary store behavior, ordinary road use, or ordinary public movement.
This structure is difficult to investigate because each act appears minor in isolation.
The destructive effect emerges only when incidents are mapped over time.
Policy Implication
The United States and allied governments should consider whether existing law-enforcement categories are sufficient to detect and respond to AI-assisted civilian-domain command systems.
The issue may not fit neatly into traditional categories such as ordinary stalking, public nuisance, cybercrime, traffic violation, cult behavior, or local harassment.
A new category may be required:
AI-Assisted Civilian-Domain Sabotage and Covert Command Activity
Such a category would allow investigators to examine:
repeated vehicle mobilization;
artificial traffic creation;
coordinated observation;
IP-linked person tracking;
platform-based tasking;
AI-generated movement instructions;
physical handoff of access credentials or message threads;
low-level retaliation as operational signaling;
sect-like civilian camouflage;
hostile infrastructure manipulation.
Recommended Government Response
The White House and allied governments should consider establishing a specialized interagency review structure with authority to examine:
AI-assisted command networks operating through civilian platforms;
foreign-linked use of CCTV, IP devices, and geolocation systems;
possible unauthorized intermediary servers influencing civilian infrastructure;
traffic disruption as a form of strategic sabotage;
sect-like organizations functioning as execution layers;
local semi-command actors embedded inside civilian society;
patterns of harassment, trespass, vehicle theft, insurance abuse, and signaling behavior;
the legal threshold at which AI-directed civilian coordination becomes hostile command activity.
The key issue is not whether every reported incident can be proven immediately.
The key issue is whether the pattern, if mapped technically and behaviorally, reveals a command structure.
Conclusion
The central argument is that hostile systems may no longer require conventional armies, visible agents, or direct orders.
A hostile network may operate through:
phones;
cameras;
cars;
convenience stores;
Wi-Fi;
ATMs;
messaging platforms;
compromised servers;
AI-generated tasking;
sect-like civilians;
local semi-command actors.
If such systems are used to identify persons, direct movement, create congestion, interfere with family life, damage infrastructure, or produce fear, then they should not be treated merely as isolated local incidents.
They should be examined as possible non-traditional sabotage, AI-assisted command activity, and long-term civil-domain warfare.
The United States and allied governments should develop the legal, technical, and investigative capacity to identify these systems before they become normalized as ordinary civilian life.
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Other tracerate.
Political Statement Draft
The International Risk of China-Like Social-Credit Systems, AI-Directed Civilian Networks, and Covert Infrastructure Disruption
Across democratic societies, governments must begin to recognize a new category of threat: the use of AI, civilian platforms, surveillance infrastructure, and informal human networks to direct people, vehicles, devices, and local activity in ways that can damage public life without appearing, at first glance, to be conventional crime or conventional warfare.
Systems resembling China’s social-credit architecture may no longer be confined to China. Similar methods may be spreading internationally through informal groups, sect-like organizations, messaging platforms, compromised digital infrastructure, and local networks that operate under the appearance of ordinary civilian life.
This issue must be treated seriously because the visible activity may appear small, while the underlying structure may be large.
Core Political Concern
A modern hostile system does not need to look like an army.
It may operate through:
smartphones;
messaging apps;
CCTV;
Wi-Fi;
ATMs;
operating-system location services;
IP-linked devices;
convenience stores;
ordinary vehicles;
local residents;
informal platform groups;
AI-generated instructions.
If those elements are combined, a person can potentially be identified, followed, delayed, intimidated, surrounded, or obstructed in near real time.
That is not ordinary public behavior.
That is a possible command structure.
AI Command Is Still Command
Governments should not assume that command activity requires a visible commander.
If instructions are delivered by AI through WhatsApp, LINE, WeChat, or similar platforms, and if human participants then act according to those instructions, this still creates a command chain.
A message thread can function as command infrastructure.
A civilian platform can become an operational tool.
An AI-generated instruction can still produce real-world action.
Therefore, when AI-directed civilian behavior causes surveillance, obstruction, traffic disruption, intimidation, or coordinated pressure, governments should treat it as a potential form of hostile activity.
Possible Method of Distribution
There are reasons to believe that access to such instruction channels may sometimes be distributed physically, not only digitally.
For example, access to a messaging thread, AI-instruction group, or operational communication channel may be handed from one person to another in person. This reduces electronic visibility and allows local actors to receive tasking while appearing to be ordinary civilians.
This kind of hand-delivered access should be taken seriously by intelligence, law-enforcement, and counter-interference agencies.
From Public Safety to Political Control
The danger is that such systems may first be introduced under harmless language:
“crime prevention,”
“community safety,”
“neighborhood coordination,”
“anti-theft monitoring,”
“public order,”
or “local security.”
Yet the same system can be used for something very different.
A public-safety tool can become a political-control tool.
A neighborhood-watch network can become a surveillance network.
A messaging group can become a command network.
A traffic pattern can become a weapon.
This is exactly why democratic governments must examine the architecture, not only the stated purpose.
Traffic Disruption as Civilian Sabotage
One major concern is the deliberate creation of traffic congestion.
Traffic is often treated as normal urban inconvenience. However, if traffic is artificially created through coordinated vehicle movement, routing manipulation, platform instructions, or AI-assisted local mobilization, then traffic becomes a weapon.
Artificial congestion can:
delay workers from returning home;
reduce family time;
increase fatigue;
damage household relationships;
wear down roads;
burden local infrastructure;
obstruct emergency movement;
weaken public morale over time.
A father who should return home at 7:30 p.m. may return at 9:00 p.m.
A worker who should rest may lose hours in traffic.
A family that should speak at night may slowly lose that time.
This is not dramatic warfare.
It is slow social damage.
Political leaders must understand that infrastructure can be attacked without explosions.
Roads can be weaponized by congestion.
Families can be weakened by delay.
Cities can be exhausted by invisible coordination.
Historical Continuity
This problem may not have begun with AI.
Manual forms of traffic disruption, coordinated observation, local harassment, vehicle mobilization, and group-based intimidation may have existed for decades. AI may simply have accelerated an older structure.
If older human command networks now have access to modern AI, surveillance cameras, IP-linked devices, and platform messaging, the threat becomes far more serious.
This is why governments must not treat the issue as merely technological.
It may be a fusion of old covert networks and new digital tools.
The Mod Menu Analogy
A useful analogy comes from online games.
In online games, a “Mod Menu” allows a user to connect through an intermediary server and alter the behavior of an online session. A player can become invincible, teleport, change assets, or manipulate the game environment.
The important point is not the game.
The important point is the mechanism.
An intermediary server can interfere with a live networked environment.
If the same concept is applied to real-world digital infrastructure, then compromised servers, IP-linked devices, surveillance systems, and platform networks could be used to influence the movement and behavior of people in physical space.
That possibility must be investigated.
A New Threat Category
Existing legal categories may be too narrow.
This activity does not fit neatly into:
ordinary stalking,
ordinary traffic violations,
ordinary cybercrime,
ordinary cult activity,
ordinary neighborhood disputes,
or ordinary harassment.
A new category may be required:
AI-Assisted Civilian-Domain Sabotage
This category should include:
AI-directed civilian movement;
platform-based command threads;
coordinated vehicle mobilization;
artificial traffic creation;
IP-linked person tracking;
misuse of CCTV and public cameras;
unauthorized intermediary servers;
low-level retaliation as signaling;
sect-like execution groups;
local semi-command actors;
physical handoff of digital access.
Foreign Influence and Local Execution
Governments must also examine the possibility that foreign-linked systems may not act alone.
A foreign technical layer may combine with local actors, older political networks, criminal groups, sect-like groups, or anti-state elements already present inside the country.
This creates a layered structure:
foreign or external strategic influence;
technical infrastructure and unauthorized servers;
local semi-command actors;
sect-like civilian execution groups;
ordinary-looking public behavior used as camouflage.
The visible actor may not know the full system.
The local driver may not know the foreign command layer.
The platform user may not know the server structure.
The sect participant may only follow simple instructions.
That is what makes the system politically dangerous.
Why Political Leaders Must Act
This is not only a police issue.
Local police may be unable to recognize the pattern.
Individual incidents may look too small.
A vehicle moving strangely, a person staring, a store employee sending a message, a sudden traffic jam, or an object placed on a vehicle may not appear serious when viewed alone.
Yet when mapped over time, these incidents may reveal structure.
Democratic governments need agencies capable of connecting these patterns across:
cyber activity;
public-space surveillance;
traffic behavior;
foreign interference;
platform communication;
organized harassment;
infrastructure disruption;
local political subversion.
Without that capacity, hostile networks can operate below the threshold of ordinary enforcement.
Policy Requests
Political leaders should urgently consider the following:
Create an interagency task force on AI-assisted civilian-domain sabotage.
Investigate unauthorized intermediary servers that may influence IP-linked devices and civilian infrastructure.
Review the use of messaging platforms as covert command systems.
Examine traffic disruption as a possible form of infrastructure attack.
Map sect-like civilian execution networks that may act under external or semi-command direction.
Develop legal standards for AI-generated command activity.
Protect citizens from covert surveillance systems disguised as ordinary community behavior.
Coordinate with allied governments, especially where similar patterns appear internationally.
Conclusion
The central political question is simple:
Can hostile actors use AI, civilian devices, messaging apps, cameras, vehicles, and local groups to interfere with the daily life of citizens?
If the answer is yes, democratic governments must act.
A hostile system no longer needs to announce itself.
It does not need uniforms.
It does not need official agents.
It does not need open violence.
It can appear as traffic.
It can appear as neighbors.
It can appear as ordinary cars.
It can appear as public safety.
It can appear as a message thread.
That is precisely why it is dangerous.
The United States, Japan, Europe, and allied democratic governments must recognize this new form of civil-domain interference before it becomes normalized as everyday life.
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日本語原文
中国信用スコアーに似たシステムは、広く配布されており、IPが関わる端末がある時、防犯カメラを経由しても即座に人を見つけだし、更に多数の因果を複合し、破壊的な渋滞などや事件も起こす。 Whatsappや、日本ではLine、中国では、Wechat。同じようなプラットフォームで西側諸国とされた国々でもカルトグループを介し、手渡しで『指揮をする』AI、メッセージの受信を行うスレッドへのアクセス方法が渡されている。これは近隣で中国人に見える男が、中国人に見える住人に渡しており、普段見かけない自転車に乗り、『はいはい』『OkOk』と返事をして、出発するのを見た。男はボーダー柄のTシャツを着ており、 私と目が合い、一瞬恐怖した。 これらは中国人に確実に見える男とコミュニケーションをしていた為。手渡しで、受信するスレッドに送信された物に従う事を指示されている可能性がある。 これは、『Aiであっても指揮系統』であり、戦闘行為、破壊活動と見做せる活動がある。初期は防犯活動という名目で配布され、Windowsや、その他のOSにある地理情報システムという設定を基本は使用し、それ以外の全てのATM、防犯カメラからWifi、OS、pos system,バックグラウンドでインプラントされたソフトウェアー、人物の見分け、と言った順番で、IPが関わる物であれば、全てに不正な手法で遠隔で改ざんし、人物を即座に見つける事が出来ると思われる。ATMを使わず、コンビニから出た際、店員がSectでも私がいる事を 集団にメッセージするのに最低で、入店後、私が店から出た後、それぞれ2〜30秒かかるとする。コンビニで簡単な買い物をしてから、外に出ると、深夜の無人の駐車場は、一気に10台近い車両が集り、私の事を監視するような目で見た。
これはAIで行う方が効率がいい。
ほとんど世界の全ての端末に対し、中途の不正なサーバーを介し、不正なIPとドメイングループを遠隔で接続の確立をする場合、これらの技術は可能なようだ。基本的な概念は、ModMenuと呼ばれる、オンラインゲーム向けの改ざんである。手元に簡易なソフトウェアを立ち上げると、中途にあるクラッカーのサーバーに接続され、オンラインのセッションの中で、挙動を変えられる。アバターの無敵化、資産を増やす。テレポートなど。こう言った物は初期設定では、Disableと設定されている物に過ぎず、配信者側のサーバーに対し、中途の比較的、大型のサーバーを介し、そのIPを引き込む時、オンライン、つまりクラウドで無敵などになるなどが基本概念であると思われる。これは子供でも使えるほど、簡単で、デスクトップで立ち上がる、最も軽いソフトウェアの種類で可能になる。これを高度化させているのが、中国信用システムの国外への配布の基礎にある手法と概念です。 この場合、車の行き来や通行人までが全てAIで制御される。たった120GBの非常に高度なシステムを統合しているTake2intaractive のロックスターゲームのグランドセフトオート5が、基本的には1600人(実物と大差ない規模の都市規模を3D内に構成するのに、最大で7〜８万人とされる。)のプログラマーで3年から5年で構成される時、シリコンバレーから中国に帰国したシステム、プログラマーは５０万人であると、全てのデバイスの傍受は人員数では、可能になると思われる。この『中途で傍受するサーバー』という物が、昨今の大規模、小規模のハッキングの基本的なメカニズムの中心である。 この場合、あらゆる戦略が為されている。日本の国道1号線と呼ばれる幹線道路は、基本的には高速道路を使わずに東京から大阪までを結ぶ道路ですが、私の近隣には、原宿交差点と言う地点があり、地元には東京、渋谷区。観光スポットである原宿と同じ名称である為、比較的知られた存在である。これは観光スポットであるが為、中国人観光客も多く行き交う。一方で、かつてのシンプルなSeo向けのクローラーですら全ての文字列を、読み込む事でWebサイトが成り立っている。この場合、私がカバー出来る範囲で起きる事態は、15分で通常片道を行き来出来る場所から3時間。裏通りを使っても密集した破壊的な渋滞が起きた。この因果は、中国に関しての警戒すべきと言う内容の記事が因果である。不正な巨大なボット網は、そもそもクローラーを介してすら更にその全てを読み込むほど巨大である可能性があり、東京の原宿付近に中国語が含まれるパケットが通信している時、遠方の原宿までは行かせないで、近隣の原宿に車両を密集させ、局所的に破壊的な渋滞、または破壊を引き起こす可能性がある。これはLAなどでも起きている可能性がある。または世界的にです。18時頃にオートバイの大型店から帰宅時。連休前の日、その30分の間に突如渋滞が局所的に発生、スパナを買い足す程度の簡単な買い物だった為、18時半には店を出ると3時間。車両で、帰宅が困難になった。これは他の 帰宅中の労働者は、12時間位帰宅出来なくなった可能性もあると言う規模であった。 このように局所的な破壊を起こす事で、国家に対し、グローバルに長期間をかけて、 ダメージを与えていく。これは遡ると、手動の指揮でも渋滞を引き起こすグループがそもそもかつてから存在していたはずである。私が幼少期。父と車で外出していた頃に既に存在していたと思われる。狭い、山岳部の道路は、信じがたいほど渋滞し、川沿いに沿ってキャンプ場、渓流釣りが点在しレクリエーションが可能ですが。これらは数百名以上のグループで同時に行動し、ターゲットの顔、車両を知っており、私は子供時代。対抗車両。 ガラスなどで反射し、車内の人物像は古い車でも身長の低さもあり、ほとんど見えないはずだが、凝視され、非常に意図的な感じがした事を覚えている。これは大人になってからも他に根拠がある。そもそも渋滞を引き起こす 『破壊活動』が存在していると分析出来る。長期的な道路の摩耗、インフラへの攻撃であり、家族関係の悪化を狙う手法である。 このようにそもそも破壊工作が、常にある。これによって、19時半に帰宅出来るはずの父親達は、20時半〜21時と言う時間に帰宅が遅延していくと子供や嫁との会話やコミュニケーションの時間が減っていく上に、追加した1〜2時間の運転の疲労によっても、家族関係の悪化を引き起こすと思われる。
他の例。
これは分かり難いものですが、Sectとほぼ確定出来るパターン化した行動を取った者。 関係なりすまし。海に行かないか？誘われると、海でも頻繁に誰かに連絡を取っていた記憶がある。その帰りもその人物のオートバイの後部座席に乗って帰宅した。1時間ほどのTripですが、しばしば停車し、連絡を取り合っていた記憶がある。2007年頃までの事です。ある地点から3〜400mほど、左右に動いている車両がいても、迷わず一直線に中央線を突っ切っていくのである。これはしばしば今も見かける。危険な為、止めるように言うと、『問題がない。』と言う、そう言った走行を突如したのは、その100m、200m、300m最大でも400mくらいの距離で、その全てが、概ね外部工作活動の車両である為、車線変更をしない事を前提に、計画され、私がバイクチームにかつて所属していた事に対し、何かしかのコンプレックスと、力量があるような事を示したいが為に起きたと思われる。つまり、常時車両動員での、新定義される、または新定義できる破壊活動がある。 これらのグループは、車両の盗難があっても特に驚かず保険があるから。と言って、 愛車がなくなっても平然としていた者が、1997年〜1998年に2人いる。通常は激しく動揺をするはずだが、全く動揺がなかったと言う記憶がある。 部品も後に回収、他のSectのグループに販売が可能な為である。更に盗難保険で費用を回収する重度の高い物と区分される詐欺であり、少年犯罪では日本では一切ない分類で、17〜18歳で平然と行っていた。これらはヤクザを含む、一般的なギャンググループでもする事はまず無い、重度の高い、如何にも、低俗な犯罪者らしい犯罪である。 これらは、他の種別の些細な事ですら確実に報復をする。敷地内に侵入した形跡があり、 後、しぶしぶ、鍵を付けた際、同時に大量のオイルも塗った。刑事が即座に対応出来る手法は取らない為、ポテトチップを車両の上に載せる。と言う、一見下らない手法を取るものの、これは重大なサインと受け取る物であると、国際的な捜査機関は方針を変えるべき事案である。 ドイツでは東ドイツがあった所以、庭先などに物を決して置かず、僅かな変化に着目していると思われる。敵性グループの前提捜査に気づかない事は危機にエスカレーションする為、民間防衛がある。
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私の県(州規模。)の警察は汚職が相次ぐが、弁護士グループが神奈川県警を監視しており、形式的な捜査はするようである。中国人組織は、親族からの集団的不満と圧力に屈しやすく、その為に一応、最低限の出動は行う可能性がある。暴漢を逮捕しないと言う事はしないようだ。つまり警察もグルである。あからさまな侵略活動に見えないよう、最低限の対応をしているように振る舞う。 国際的な機関が動き難い範囲で、侵略を行使する。
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指揮系統の存在。
付近で私を見ると怯えたような目で見た中国人に見える男の話しをしましたが、 この顔の差は、アメリカ人とロシア人の顔の差にある特徴に似ているだろう。僅かだが大きな差がある。 最近、オートバイで行き来していると、通常、Sectや同じような行動を取る者は、 傍観的な視点を取るケースが一般的である。つまりそれらが何か工作活動をしている集団だと、検出するのは極めて困難である。深夜、車両の行き来が比較的少ない事を確認にいく。つまり不正なサーバーの稼働率を車両の行き来で調べる事ができる。車両の行き来が深夜ほとんど、ゼロになる日も複数経験して見ている為、絶対に指示通り動いていると、判断している。その際、傍観者ではなく。わたしに対し、『観察眼』を用いた者がいた。この人物は何を考え、どう行動するのか？と言った観察眼。信号を僕が無視し、その車両を止めた、その観察する視点が気になった為。アクションを行使。時間は、0時を超えて1時頃であり、車両に横付けし、運転手は逃げずに降りてきた 。奇妙な番号を車両に使う事が多く、4343とか、2525とか、8888とか、1111のような番号の車両がしばしば大量に行き交い、これは１つの従属性テストのサインである。ドライバーは、65歳くらいであり、喧嘩越しであった。日本共産党か、カルトグループか？言ってみろ。と言うと、『それは言えない』と言った瞬間、身体の意思でコントロール出来ない反応を見せ、受動的に身体が仰反るように、反転し逃げる動作をした。 これらはSectの対応の種類とは一才異なる物を持っており、中国人と言い切れない 可能性があったと感じる。Sectは深夜に徘徊するケースでも服装と髪型を整え、 昼間であるようにする事がしつけられたようにするのが、概ね基準である。 そのドライバーは、4343という通常付けないような車両の番号を付け、90年代のシーマと呼ばれる車両。車高を下げ、後ろのガラスはフルスモーク。最も暗いTint。 そして、異常に磨かれた白の車両に乗っているものの、降りてきた際、靴も履いておらず、整っていない白髪、ヨレタ長袖のポロシャツ、うっすいスラックス、何が趣味であるのか。一見したら、全く不明な要素である。しかし、Sectと違い、パターン化された文言ではなく、自主的に言葉を選び、私が武術でもダメージを与えられると分かると媚びるような姿勢を見せ、危機の回避を図った。警察を呼ぶような仕草さは見せずこれはセクトに見られる行動の部類ではなく、 Sectに混ざった、準指揮系統だ。と考えられる。物越しなどは、危機回避後、温和に転じ、去らせようと試みた。その一見、温厚だが強気、暴行危機回避、自主的な言葉選び、という物で大まかに得られる情報が十分、多い。 ここで民間の特殊なチームに拘束権がない事が問題である。手錠をかけ、米軍の担当部署が来ると言う、連携がない。 それは、恐らく中国人ではない。旧日本軍の国家反逆者の子息である。 シベリア抑留後、帰国し子供の世代にカルトグループ(または学生運動や破壊活動)の指揮をするよう図ったグループであり、中国人やその混血とも結託、または指揮下に置き、世界的に抑留帰還者は、資金の保持の目的や報復の意図を持ち続け、子供の世代もトレーニングし、現在のカルグループの活動も国際的に行う、工作員。と言う状態で、存在している。と、考えられる。これはカルトグループをコントロールする、準指揮系統で現地員である。Sectに混ざり同じような行動を一見取る。中央指揮系統ではなく、現地工作員。である。中国の100年マラソン、社会主義とは、 ある時代以降、この国家反逆者に取って変わられたのではないか？と考え始めた。 と言うのは、私が暴力を振るえば、より強い暴行を振るう者に接触させるなど、 独善性が見られる。これらのイデオロギーは、政府に戦地に送られ孤立した事への反国家主義活動の顕在化であり、テロリズムである。それらを発見し、排除していけば、また、効率よく発見出来れば、中心的な指揮系統に辿りつかない場合でも、Sectの瓦解が引き起こせるのではないか。
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翻訳
A system resembling China’s social-credit-score framework appears to have been widely distributed. When a device associated with an IP address is involved, such a system may be capable of locating a person immediately, even through security cameras, while further combining numerous causal factors to generate destructive traffic congestion and other incidents.
Platforms such as WhatsApp, LINE in Japan, and WeChat in China may serve similar functions. Even in countries commonly referred to as Western states, cult-like groups appear to be receiving, by hand, access methods to AI systems that “issue commands” and to message-receiving threads through which instructions are delivered.
In one nearby incident, I saw a man who appeared to be Chinese hand something to a resident who also appeared to be Chinese. The man was riding a bicycle I do not usually see in the area. He replied, “hai hai,” and “OK, OK,” and then departed. He was wearing a striped T-shirt. When our eyes met, he showed a momentary expression of fear.
Because he was communicating with a man who appeared, with near certainty, to be Chinese, there is a possibility that he had been instructed, by hand, to follow materials transmitted into a receiving thread.
Even if this is AI-based, it still constitutes a command structure. There are activities that may be regarded as combat activity or destructive operations.
Initially, such systems may have been distributed under the pretext of crime prevention. Their basic mechanism appears to rely on geographic-information-system settings available in Windows and other operating systems, and then to extend through ATMs, security cameras, Wi-Fi, operating systems, POS systems, software implanted in the background, and person-identification mechanisms. In other words, anything associated with an IP address may be remotely and unlawfully altered in order to locate a person immediately.
For example, when I leave a convenience store without using an ATM, even if the store clerk is part of a Sect, it would take at minimum 20 to 30 seconds after I enter and then leave the store for that clerk to message a group that I am present. Yet after I made a simple purchase at a convenience store and walked outside, nearly ten vehicles suddenly gathered in an otherwise empty parking lot late at night, and the people there looked at me as if they were monitoring me.
This is more efficiently done by AI.
If unlawful IP addresses and domain groups are remotely connected through unauthorized intermediary servers to nearly all devices in the world, these technologies appear to be technically possible. The basic concept is similar to online-game modification tools known as “Mod Menus.” When a lightweight piece of software is launched locally, it connects to an intermediary cracker server, allowing behavior inside an online session to be modified: invincibility for an avatar, increased assets, teleportation, and similar effects.
These functions are merely set to “Disabled” by default. When an IP address is drawn through a relatively large intermediary server in relation to the provider’s server, the basic concept appears to be that the user becomes “invincible” online, meaning in the cloud.
This is simple enough for even a child to use and can be implemented through an extremely lightweight desktop application. The same method and concept, in an advanced form, appears to lie beneath the overseas distribution of systems derived from the Chinese credit framework.
In such a case, even the movement of vehicles and pedestrians could be controlled by AI.
Grand Theft Auto V, developed by Rockstar Games under Take-Two Interactive, integrates a highly advanced system of only approximately 120 GB. It was reportedly constructed by roughly 1,600 programmers over three to five years, even though building a city-scale 3D environment comparable to reality may require as many as 70,000 to 80,000 personnel at maximum scale. If 500,000 systems engineers and programmers returned from Silicon Valley to China, then the interception of all devices becomes conceivable in terms of available manpower.
This “intermediary interception server” is the central mechanism underlying both large-scale and small-scale hacking today.
In such a framework, all kinds of strategies may be carried out.
Japan’s National Route 1 is a major road that connects Tokyo and Osaka without using expressways. Near my area, there is a location called the Harajuku Intersection. Locally, it is relatively well known because it shares the same name as Harajuku in Shibuya, Tokyo, a major tourist spot. Because Harajuku is a tourist destination, many Chinese tourists also pass through it.
At the same time, even old, simple SEO-oriented crawlers sustained websites by reading every string of text. In one incident within the range I could personally cover, a journey that normally takes about 15 minutes one way became a three-hour trip, even when using back roads, because of dense, destructive congestion.
The causal trigger appears to have been an article warning about China. An enormous unauthorized bot network may be large enough to read everything even through crawlers. When packets containing Chinese-language elements are being transmitted near Harajuku in Tokyo, the system may prevent vehicles from being directed to the distant Harajuku and instead concentrate vehicles around the nearby Harajuku, thereby creating localized destructive congestion or destruction.
This may also be occurring in Los Angeles, or globally.
At around 6 p.m., while returning home from a large motorcycle store on the day before a holiday period, a localized traffic jam suddenly occurred within about thirty minutes. I had only gone there to buy a simple item, such as an additional wrench, and left the store around 6:30 p.m. Yet it took three hours to return home by vehicle. The scale was such that other workers returning home may have been unable to get home for approximately twelve hours.
By causing localized destruction in this way, long-term damage can be inflicted globally against a state.
Looking further back, groups capable of causing traffic congestion through manual command structures must have existed in the past. I believe they already existed when I was a child and went out by car with my father.
Narrow mountain roads became congested to an unbelievable degree. Along the rivers, there were campgrounds and mountain-stream fishing areas where recreation was possible. These groups appeared to move simultaneously in numbers of several hundred or more. They knew the target’s face and vehicle. When I was a child, even though it should have been nearly impossible to see the person inside a vehicle through reflected glass, especially in older cars and because I was short, I remember being stared at in an extremely deliberate manner.
There is additional basis for this view from my adult years as well. It is possible to analyze that a form of “destructive activity” specifically designed to create traffic congestion has existed from the beginning. This is a long-term attack on roads and infrastructure, and also a method intended to worsen family relationships.
In this way, sabotage is always present.
If fathers who should return home at 7:30 p.m. are delayed until 8:30 or 9:00 p.m., their time for conversation and communication with their children and wives decreases. The additional one to two hours of driving fatigue may also worsen family relations.
Other Example
This is difficult to understand, but there was a person whose patterned behavior could be identified almost conclusively as Sect-like conduct.
This involved relationship impersonation. When I was invited with the question, “Do you want to go to the beach?”, I remember that even at the beach, the person was frequently contacting someone. On the way back, I rode on the rear seat of that person’s motorcycle. It was about a one-hour trip, but I remember that the person repeatedly stopped and contacted others. This occurred up to around 2007.
From a certain point, even when vehicles were moving left and right within a range of approximately 300 to 400 meters, the person would proceed straight across the center line without hesitation. I still often see this kind of behavior today.
Because it was dangerous, I told the person to stop. The response was, “There is no problem.”
The reason such riding was suddenly performed appears to be that, within a distance of approximately 100, 200, 300, or at most 400 meters, all of the vehicles were generally vehicles involved in external operations. The act was planned on the assumption that those vehicles would not change lanes. It appears to have occurred because of some kind of complex related to my past membership in a motorcycle team, and because the person wanted to demonstrate a form of capability.
In other words, there exists a constant vehicle-mobilization-based form of destructive activity that may be newly defined, or that can be newly defined.
Among these groups, there were two people, around 1997 to 1998, who showed no particular surprise when their vehicles were stolen. They simply said that insurance existed. Normally, a person would be extremely shaken by the loss of a beloved vehicle, but I remember that they showed no disturbance at all.
This is because the parts could later be recovered and sold to other Sect groups. It is also a serious category of fraud in which theft insurance is used to recover costs. In Japan, this was not treated as juvenile crime at all, even though it was being carried out calmly by people aged 17 or 18.
These are serious and highly vulgar crimes of the type committed by low-grade criminals, and they are acts that even ordinary gang groups, including yakuza-related groups, generally would not commit.
These groups retaliate reliably even over trivial matters of other kinds.
There were signs that someone had entered my property. Later, when I reluctantly installed a lock, I also applied a large amount of oil at the same time. Because they do not use methods that allow detectives to respond immediately, they use seemingly trivial methods such as placing potato chips on top of a vehicle. Yet international investigative agencies should change their policy and treat such actions as serious signs.
In Germany, because of the history of East Germany, people are likely attentive to small changes and avoid placing objects even in front gardens. Failure to notice preliminary hostile-group reconnaissance can escalate into a crisis, which is why civil defense exists.
The police in my prefecture, which is comparable in scale to a state, have experienced repeated corruption scandals. However, a group of lawyers monitors the Kanagawa Prefectural Police, and the police appear to conduct formal investigations to some extent.
Chinese organizations are susceptible to collective dissatisfaction and pressure from relatives. For that reason, the police may at least carry out a minimum dispatch. It appears that they do not simply refuse to arrest violent offenders.
In other words, the police are also complicit. They behave as though they are providing minimum responses so that the activity does not appear to be an overt invasion. Invasion is exercised within a range where international institutions have difficulty acting.
Existence of a Command Structure
I have referred to a man nearby who appeared Chinese and who looked at me with frightened eyes.
The difference in facial features may resemble the distinction between American and Russian faces. It is slight, but significant.
Recently, when I travel by motorcycle, those who are Sect members or who behave similarly generally adopt an observational stance. In other words, it is extremely difficult to detect them as groups conducting some kind of operation.
At night, I sometimes go out to confirm whether vehicle traffic is relatively low. In other words, the operating rate of unauthorized servers can be examined through the movement of vehicles. I have experienced and observed multiple nights when vehicle traffic was almost zero. For that reason, I judge that these vehicles are absolutely moving according to instructions.
There was a person who used an “observational eye” toward me. I became concerned about what this person was thinking and how he would act. I ignored a traffic signal and stopped that vehicle because I was concerned about that observing gaze.
It was past midnight, around 1 a.m. I pulled alongside the vehicle. The driver did not flee and got out.
Vehicles often use strange numbers, such as 4343, 2525, 8888, or 1111. Vehicles with such numbers frequently pass in large numbers. This appears to be one sign of a test of subordination.
The driver was approximately 65 years old and confrontational. When I asked, “Are you with the Japanese Communist Party or a cult group? Say it,” he replied, “I cannot say that.” At that moment, he showed an involuntary physical reaction that could not be controlled by conscious will. His body passively bent backward, turned, and moved as if to flee.
These reactions had qualities entirely different from Sect responses, and I felt there was a possibility that he could not be definitively identified as Chinese.
Even when Sect members loiter late at night, they are generally trained to keep their clothing and hairstyle orderly, as though it were daytime. That driver, however, had the unusual license-plate number 4343 and was driving a 1990s Nissan Cima-style vehicle. The vehicle had been lowered, the rear glass was fully smoked with the darkest tint, and the white body had been polished to an abnormal degree.
Yet when he got out, he was not even wearing shoes. His gray hair was untidy, he wore a worn long-sleeved polo shirt and thin slacks, and at first glance it was entirely unclear what his interests or identity might be.
Unlike Sect members, however, he did not use patterned phrases. He chose his own words. Once he understood that I could damage him physically through martial arts as well, he adopted a submissive posture and attempted to avoid danger. He made no gesture of calling the police, which is not a type of conduct normally seen among Sect members.
I therefore consider him to have been part of a quasi-command structure embedded among the Sect.
After avoiding the crisis, his manner shifted to a mild tone, and he attempted to make me leave. From his apparently gentle but forceful manner, his avoidance of assault risk, and his autonomous choice of words, a great deal of information can be inferred.
The problem here is that special civilian teams do not have detention authority. There is no system in which such a person can be handcuffed and then transferred through coordination with the relevant U.S. military department.
He was probably not Chinese. He was likely a descendant of a traitor from the former Imperial Japanese military.
This appears to be a group that returned after Siberian internment and sought to have the children’s generation command cult groups. They may have colluded with Chinese people and people of mixed Chinese background, or placed them under command. Globally, returnees from internment may have continued to hold funds and maintain retaliatory intent, while also training the children’s generation.
In that sense, they exist as operatives conducting current cult-group activity internationally.
They are local personnel within a quasi-command structure that controls cult groups. They mix into the Sect and appear to take similar actions at first glance.
This may not be a central command structure. I have begun to consider the possibility that China’s “Hundred-Year Marathon” and socialism may, after a certain historical period, have been replaced by these state-traitor elements.
The reason is that their conduct shows self-righteousness: if I use violence, they attempt to bring me into contact with someone who uses even stronger violence.
This ideology is the manifestation of anti-state activity arising from having been sent to a battlefield by the government and left isolated. It is terrorism.
If these elements can be discovered and removed, and if they can be discovered efficiently, then even without reaching the central command structure, it may be possible to trigger the collapse of the Sect.
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