Due to HTML page-layout issues, I will post the long version, the short version, and the Japanese version separately.

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Soviet Detention in the Second World War and the Strategic Implications of Former Prisoner Networks

The following are examples of groups detained by the Soviet Union during and after the Second World War.

In conventional summaries, prisoners from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada are generally not listed, because these states were not enemy powers of the Soviet Union at the time. However, the full reality remains uncertain.

What is clear is that German prisoners far outnumbered Japanese detainees. Soldiers of Nazi Germany captured during the Nazi era, including those who did not return, reached a scale of roughly one million. In the hypothesis considered here, these non-returnees should not be treated only as deaths. Some may have remained within postwar networks, later encountering other former prisoners or displaced groups in places such as Cuba, eventually forming structures capable of influencing even China or other major states.

The presence of former Nazi Party soldiers who escaped to countries such as Argentina is already widely known. The essential issue is this: individuals who had received advanced military training, combat experience, infiltration capability, and intelligence-related skills may have continued to operate. If such knowledge was transmitted to descendants through similar training, then groups motivated by revenge against the United States, against their former homelands, against Jewish Americans, or against the broader Western order may have emerged.

If these actors had little or no connection with the economic development, liberalisation, and cultural transformation of the postwar Western world, their strategic outlook may have remained closer to the generation of Eisenhower, Patton, Winston Churchill, Stalin, and Hitler — a generation that destroyed states and transformed entire ideologies. Their mindset may therefore differ radically from the postwar Western understanding of human rights. Instead, they may have moved further toward advanced intelligence warfare, clandestine operations, and covert political interference.

In such a case, governments need to understand this primarily as a matter of war at the level of states and governments. It should not become a simple act of blame directed at individual soldiers or their descendants. However, if such individuals chose war out of anger, and if they were trained from childhood, no government can easily predict what kind of emotional or strategic response may follow.

Therefore, the basic position should not be one of retaliation or personal accusation. The correct framework is that this is a governmental and strategic war. If hostile action is taken, then a state must be prepared to respond. Given the scale involved, the dismantling of such networks may also become a realistic option.

These structures are already non-conventional and non-combatant in form. The key intelligence question expected of each state is: where are they hiding, and through what local structures are they operating?

At the same time, disabling the activities of local sect-type pawns in each country may be more effective than attempting to locate every higher-level command element directly. This may weaken or paralyse the command structure itself.

This requires long-term strategy, readiness for a prolonged conflict, and a change in political thinking away from a narrow focus on management theory and economics. A comprehensive political method is essential. The structure may be decentralised, consisting of local agents hidden within sect-type groups in each country, and another group remaining within the former territories of the Soviet Union.

If there are descendants of former detainees operating around politicians in various countries, one point must be made clearly. If they are not likely to leave their current place of residence or begin a completely different life, and if they continue to operate covertly around political groups, then earlier policies may already have evolved into more fragmented and hostile forms — such as the transformation of police bodies into drug-linked organisations.

In that case, their best practical option may be to protect the place where they currently live, rather than continue a covert war. Unless strong anti-sect measures and large-scale operations are launched, groups remaining in former Soviet territory may still be inheriting the strategic mindset of the Second World War era. In effect, they may already be positioned in the same category as enemy combatants.

One visible method of neutralising such structures would therefore be to disable the activities of sect-type networks in each country.

In the initial phase, investigative bodies would need to operate on a scale comparable to a major military formation. A form of civil defence or national defence participation may also be required, allowing constant monitoring and demonstrating that the authorities are aware of the activity.

The first reaction test should be to require written pledges or undertakings from identified participants. After that, depending on the response, large-scale arrests may be necessary, including among retired personnel. In some cases, such action may need to be extensive. This may be the only realistic path toward resolving the situation.

When I visited the United States, these group characteristics already appeared to be internationalised. There seemed to be people coordinating locally. Among Americans, people from Europe, and people from Japan, there were individuals who appeared to share sect-like characteristics. This suggests that by around 2000, these structures had already developed into a fully international network.

For that reason, politicians themselves must take part in the strict screening of the personnel assigned to such matters.

The current justice system is, in effect, little more than a document-screening mechanism. It is largely outsourced and delegation-based. It depends entirely on trust. When that trust is broken, or when hostile forces possess enough strength to exploit its vulnerabilities, police and military institutions may lose their real effectiveness. This would represent a crisis for every state.

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Examples of Soviet Detention and Forced Transfer

Country / Ethnic Group	Example
Japan	After 1945, soldiers of the Kwantung Army and civilians were sent to Siberia, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, and other areas for forced labour. The scale is generally estimated at around 600,000 people.
Germany	German soldiers captured on the Eastern Front were sent to Soviet camps and labour sites across the USSR. The scale was around three million, with the last returns taking place in the mid-1950s. The number of non-returnees reached roughly one million.
Austria	Austrians who served on the German side were sent to Soviet prisoner-of-war camps in the same manner as German soldiers.
Hungary	Hungarian soldiers and civilians were incorporated into the Soviet forced-labour camp system. Soviet records indicate that around 550,000 reached places of detention.
Romania	Many Romanian soldiers became Soviet prisoners of war and were sent to labour camps in Tyumen, Kazakhstan, coal mines, forests, peat works, and other labour sites.
Italy	Italian forces on the Eastern Front, especially those connected to the ARMIR destroyed around Stalingrad, were captured in large numbers. More than 60,000 are said to have been taken by the Red Army.
Finland	Finnish soldiers captured during the Winter War and the Continuation War were sent to Soviet labour, transport, and hospital camps.
Poland	After the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939, Polish soldiers, officials, families, and civilians were deported to Siberia and Central Asia. In 1940, records indicate that around 250,000 Poles and others were deported.
Baltic States	Residents of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were arrested, detained, and forcibly deported to Siberia and other areas from 1940–41 onward.
Volga Germans	Ethnic Germans within the Soviet Union. From 1941 onward, they were collectively deported to Siberia and Central Asia. The scale is estimated at around 1.2 million people.
Crimean Tatars	In 1944, under Stalin, around 200,000 Crimean Tatars were forcibly deported to Central Asia and other areas under the accusation of collaboration with Nazi Germany.
Chechens,   Ingush, and  other North Caucasus peoples ーーー the full-length version are next page. ーーー