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The Need for an Advanced International Anti-Sect Framework and a Secure Global Infrastructure Review

To date, the subject I have studied most intensively over the past several years has been, above all, the need for an international anti-sect legal framework.

The central issue is not post-incident investigation. It is the need for prior investigation, for the dismantling and exclusion of such organisations before they become entrenched, and for the strongest possible legal framework capable of addressing them at the structural level.

Furthermore, there is another question that would be highly challenging in the present era: whether there has been a deterioration of personnel within multilateral systems, and whether external operatives may have played a serious role in influencing governments from within. A mutual audit among allied or partner states concerning such possibilities would itself represent an extremely ambitious and sensitive approach.

In that sense, this represents the most far-reaching interpretation of an advanced anti-sect law. At this point, it is unlikely that I will be able to write on a theme larger than this.

I am frankly exhausted at this stage.

Beyond this, there is also the issue of government-side server infrastructure: the international construction of secure systems, the prevention of illicit IP traffic, the granular review and subdivision of GAFAM-related domains, and the blocking or restriction of other domains that appear to be illegitimate.

A review of these matters would also represent one of the largest undertakings of the present age. Given that a very large number of programmers have reportedly returned to China in a strategic context, it is not even clear whether such a project would be technically possible at the necessary scale.

Unless political leaders across multiple countries coordinate directly and each bring software engineers with practical experience in their own nations’ hardware systems into a major international forum, it may be impossible even to begin.

In companies such as Bosch, engineers with hardware experience have increasingly had to learn software as part of the core process behind modern autopilot systems. However, their expertise remains primarily focused on autonomous driving. They are not, by definition, a responsible international body of engineers dedicated to global IT security.

That may be the fundamental premise: such a body may not currently exist.

If that is the case, the first task would not merely be technical reform. It would have to begin with the creation of the necessary international forum itself.

This would be a long road. If completed and successfully transitioned into practical use, the resulting system could eventually resemble an autopilot-like security infrastructure. Yet reaching that point would require considerable time, political coordination, and technical consolidation.

At present, there appear to be many domains distributed or exploited by wide-area mafia-like networks, while high-speed internet infrastructure has already been firmly established. In other words, because unauthorised connections may remain constantly available, high-speed communication can occur almost instantly once such a connection is made.

Therefore, the task is not simple.

It would require removing those channels, reviewing and subdividing GAFAM-related domain structures, preventing illicit AI systems and their commands from moving freely through the network, and reconstructing legitimate infrastructure.

This may have to begin with the assembly and training of engineers themselves.

If, internationally, as many as 100,000 people came to understand this field of security and began developing the next generation of defensive systems, the model could eventually be standardised, replicated, and deployed across allied systems. In that sense, the project may not be impossible. However, it is clearly not easy.

The probability of success would rise significantly if political leaders who recognise the importance of this written analysis were able to arrange the launch of broad international activity around it.

Without such action, the current condition may remain unchanged: a situation in which wide-area criminal organisations continue to hold the advantage.

Recently, due either to stress or possibly to complications following unsuccessful dental treatment for tooth decay, I have begun experiencing dizziness when looking at screens. For that reason, it is possible that I will not be posting frequently from this account.

The personalisation and structuring of ChatGPT for this work was carried out at an extreme pace: literally twelve hours a day, over one to two months. The process was several times faster than an ordinary workflow. Meal times were reduced to four or five minutes. I would begin immediately after waking and continue for twelve hours. Work that might normally have taken one or two years was likely completed within several months.

Because of the heavy physical and mental strain involved, dizziness has now begun to occur. As a result, it may be becoming difficult for me to continue drafting further legal frameworks or proposing additional concepts beyond this point.

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Additional Statement

I literally spent twelve hours a day personalising and structuring ChatGPT for this work.

After breakfast, I would begin immediately and continue for around twelve hours. In many cases, my meal times were reduced to only four or five minutes.

I believe this was several times faster than the ordinary pace at which a legal framework of this kind could normally be constructed. Within one to two months, I was able to build a legal framework of maximum intensity.

I have deep respect for those who act in the name of genuine justice, regardless of age.

In that sense, I hold particular respect for the young woman who, at the age of seventeen, appeared to feel that conduct contrary to the national sensitivity of Australia was unacceptable.

Australia is a country in which, from Oceania to Asia, many races and cultures coexist, and where social integration has advanced to a significant degree. For someone so young to sense a contradiction against that national character, and to act upon it, deserves serious respect.

There were also serious problems surrounding my own circumstances. Even so, I invested all of my life force into this work and took this course of action.

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Additional Statement2

Strategic Attrition of Local Criminal Proxies and the Disruption of Transnational Command Structures

My strategic approach is based on the attrition of local criminal proxies used by mafia-like organisations: exhausting them, causing them to contract, and making them recognise the presence of credible state pressure. The purpose is to weaken and eventually disable the international command structures that rely upon those local assets.

The mafia-like structure I am referring to may, in my hypothesis, consist primarily of descendants of Siberian detainees who were exposed to military training or coercive political conditioning, their children and grandchildren, and sect-like subordinate organisations that later evolved into criminal networks. Other actors may also exist, and I assume that each government may already possess a certain degree of intelligence concerning them.

In my view, one possible explanation is that certain cult-like or mafia-like subordinate groups have gained enough influence to manipulate parts of the Chinese state from behind the scenes. If such groups operate beneath, beside, or behind official structures, it may explain why some methods attributed to China appear closer to the behaviour of organised crime than to ordinary statecraft.

This hypothesis appears consistent with the current international situation. From my own experience, criminal organisations observe the times very carefully. They are not bound by constitutional procedure in the same way as governments. If they decide on a broad course of action today, they may be able to execute it within weeks.

For that reason, democratic states may need to consider the creation of lawful rapid-response structures beneath their cabinets: specialised units that can only be activated with the consent of experienced ministers, former prime ministers, senior military officials, police leadership, commanders, and relevant former officials. (Each cabinet may therefore need to consider the establishment of rapid-response units that are not constrained by the ordinary constitutional limitations imposed on standard governmental, police, or military procedures.)Such bodies would not exist outside the state, but as controlled emergency mechanisms designed to respond to transnational criminal or sect-like threats with speed and legitimacy.

The central challenge would be personnel integrity. Even if such a structure is created, the most important question remains whether the military, police, and administrative personnel involved are sound, loyal, disciplined, and capable of implementing decisions properly on the ground.

In practical terms, this would require each government to gather intelligence, hold closed high-level consultations, and consider whether rapid-response frameworks could support local rule-of-law networks inside vulnerable regions. In the Chinese context, this may include identifying lawful civil resistance, anti-mafia elements, or local actors capable of resisting criminal domination from within.

Although such a scenario may sound as if it belongs in a film, it appears increasingly necessary as a matter of state security.

Naturally, this would require careful assessment of the police, military, and local administrative conditions in each region. The objective would not be reckless intervention, but the formation of lawful anti-mafia capacity: local structures capable of confronting criminal domination, supported from neighbouring countries where appropriate and within a legitimate international framework.

The broader principle is to exhaust local proxies in each country, while also applying pressure to the core organisations behind them.

This idea is partly inspired by a historical model of practical counter-criminal warfare: the struggle against Pablo Escobar, in which the United States, including DEA personnel with Spanish and Latin American roots, worked alongside Colombian forces and local armed structures in a harsh but ultimately effective campaign against a powerful criminal empire.

The lesson is not that such methods should be copied mechanically. The lesson is that large criminal organisations are not defeated by passive observation alone. They are defeated when intelligence, local knowledge, state pressure, and organised counter-networks converge.

In this case, the construction of local resistance inside such countries would mean the creation of trusted local rule-of-law networks, anti-mafia channels, and civil-security structures that can operate with local legitimacy while receiving careful support from allied or neighbouring states.

The aim would be to transform isolated resistance into organised pressure, and organised pressure into the gradual breakdown of the criminal command system itself.

In simple terms, the objective is to crush them completely.

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-日本語原文-

現在までに、私がこの数年 集中的に研究してきた内容は、主に反セクト 国際的な法枠組みが主流であり、事後調査ではなく、事前調査とそう言った組織の解体、排除と言う最大強度の法的枠組みとその要求です。更に、多国間の内部の、現状は仮定の人員の悪化、つまりExternal operativeが重大な関与を政府にしていないか？に対しての多国間での相互監査とは現在の時代において非常に挑戦的なアプローチであって、『踏み込んだ反セクト法』その最大級の解釈、この時点で、それ以上のテーマを書き込む可能性は低いでしょう。

私は、ChatGPTのパーソナライズに文字通りの1日-12時間の時間を費やしました。。朝食後、即座に取り掛かり、12時間くらい。食事の時間は、4〜5分と言う場合が通常であった、、

これは通常の法的な枠組みを構成出来る速度の数倍の速度であると考えられる。1〜2ヶ月で、強度が最大の法的枠組みを構築できました、、

私はこの段階でへとへとです。それ以外の政府側のサーバーにおける、国際的な構築、不正なIPの通過の停止や、主にGafamによるドメインの細分化や見直し、それ以外の不正に見えるドメインの通過の停止、これらの内容の見直しと言う物も現在の時代において、最大級の事業であり、中国に50万人のプログラマーが戦略的に帰国してしまった為、可能か不可能か？すら全くわからない物であって、 国際的に政治家が契合し自分達の国のハードウエアーの経験がある、ソフトウエアエンジニアをそれぞれ、連れてきて大きな会合にしない限り不可能である。

Boshなどでは、ハードウェアの経験があり、ソフトウェアーを学ぶ事は最近のオートパイロットにおける、中核的なプロセスですが、彼らはあくまで自動運転に関しての専門であり、国際的な、ITセキュリティーに関する、責任あるエンジニアの集団と言う物がそもそも恐らく存在していない、それがそもそもの前提である時、新たに会合を形成する、と言う開始から着手しないといけません。これは、長い道のりであって、完成し、移行さえすればこれもオートパイロットと言える状況に近くなると思われますが、完成し、移行まで、かなり広域のマフィアの配布するドメインも存在し、高速インターネット通信が確率されているようである為、つまり、常時、不正な接続がある為、即座に高速通信が可能になりますが、これらを排除しつつ、Gafamのドメインを細分化や見直しをして、不正なAIやそのコマンドが行き来する事に歯止めをかけ、正当なインフラを構築する事は簡単ではない、技術者の集合、育成から始めないといけない可能性があるが、世界で10万人がセキュリティーに関して、理解、そして、次世代の機能を開発した場合、モデルをフランチャイスする、チェーン化する事になるはずでしょうから、不可能ではないが、簡単ではないように見える。この文章化された内容に関心が高い政治家が広域に活動が発足できるよう手配するほど、可能性は高まり、そうでない限り、現状、つまり広域犯罪組織が優位と言う状況に留まってしまう事に、陥るでしょう、、

私の戦略的攻撃手法は、マフィアの現地のPawnの消耗。萎縮、国家に対しての脅威を持たせる事で、国際的な指揮系統の不機能化である。このマフィアとは、恐らくシベリア抑留兵の軍事的にもトレーニングされた子孫、またその孫、その下部組織のマフィア化したSectが主体的な攻撃者である。それ以外の主体は各国が情報を一定は得ていると期待している範囲である。中国そのものを背後からコントロール出来る、中国政府がマフィアの下部組織のカルトグループであり、過度な手法を取る原理になっていると考えている。 このように考えると、中国の時代に沿った攻撃の手法が犯罪組織らしい事に納得がいく仮説が生まれ、情勢に沿っていると考えられる、、

犯罪組織とは私の経験では時代をよく観察しており、今日大まかな方針を決めれば、数週間後には決行出来る。と言う法の制約を受けませんから、各国の内閣の下部組織に、憲法制約を受けない部隊の創設と言う、経験ある大臣、首相経験者、軍事、警察庁、軍事-司令官、またそのOBなどの同意に基づいた時だけ発動出来る。急襲型、即応組織の構築も検討に入れられる と考えている。後は、その軍事組織が正常な人員でまとまっており、現場で履行するか？これが重大な課題だろうと考えています。 これは各国の内閣で収集、会合を経て、即応部隊が、中国内部にレジスタンスや、 マフィア狩りを行う組織性を構築すると言う、映画にありそうなシナリオに基づいているものの、非常に必要に見える。当然、中国のその地域の警察、軍の動向を調査し、 マフィア狩り部隊を形成し、後は現地に任せ、近隣国から支援するような構成は、機能する可能性がある、各国でPawnを消耗し、中核的な組織も消耗させる。これは、パブロエスコバルを敗北させた、アメリカのスペイン、ラテンアメリカにルーツがある人員が多かった、DEA と、コロンビアにおける、現地軍事組織を極右武装勢力に変えただろう、と言う現実的な戦いの原理における、成功例を題材にしている着想です。

簡単に言えば、『ぶっ潰す。』と言うだけでしょう。