私の周囲に2000年-2005年頃から現れた少女のグループとは、非常に愛情深く中国に出生があるグループは親族で集まり合う特性があり、それに近い台湾人3世の元恋人の家族も常に親族と集まり合うのが好きで、近所にすら住み合う。これは日本以外のアジア全体にある特性で、家族以外は信用さえほとんどしない。と言う文化があるのは理解されている方もいると思います。一方で一般的な先進国になった国とは、信用が重視され、嘘を気軽に吐ける環境ではありません。些細な物、些細な価格でも通常の先進国は、1ドルなら1ドルです。と、額面通りの数字と関係しか育たず、1ドルを払い終わったら店を後にするだけの関係である。北米や欧州はそれでもコミュニティーの中にランダムエンカウンターが存在し、店に入ってもHigh。と挨拶をする店舗がありますが、私の都市の環境では、方言もなく日本の1960年代頃から東北地方。日本の北部に出生を持った人が多く、寡黙に働く事が好きな人が多い可能性がある。つまりマニュアル通りに働く事に最も強いエネルギーが発揮する女性が多く、カジュアルな会話を最も嫌う傾向がある。女性同士は休憩時間盛んなコミュケーションを交わし、ロジカルですらなく男性がよく理解出来ない会話をする場合がある。

日本の人種的ルーツにおいて、南方と北方、モンゴルのような地域から数万年前から移動してきたグループ、または小型の船での移動が紀元前に人類は得意なグループがいた、ポリネシアやメラネシアは今でも小型の船で星を観測し夜間に100kmほどの移動ができる。移動手段。そう言った航海術を現在でも保持

している。この場合、日本に南方からこの数万年の間に移動してきたグループが存在し、縄文遺跡では南米大陸における裸族と全く同じ様式の住居に住んでいたようである為、そこでは子供の少女も含んだ出産と性行為における選別を男性が行う。

中年の男性が寧ろ、10代の女の子の集団に身体を弄られる。くすぐられ、現代の社会制度。学校制度等の考え方と生じた男女関係と真逆の文化が存在したようですが、DNAや本能求める物はさほど変わり映えしない可能性がある。単に抑圧的に振る舞う事に半ば強制的に慣れてしまい、男性は常に無意識に若い女性を含め周囲を確認し視線を送り無意識に周囲を見ているだろう。つまり社会における関係性は人類進化の歴史から見た場合、非常に抑制されており、ジャマイカのような国ではあらゆる交際相手と性行為をして、子供が他の場所にいても良い。と言う慣習が成り立っていますが、先進国では難しいものに変わった。と考えられる。つまり男性は本来の本能的な活動から急激にこの100年で抑制的に生きている可能性があります。

この場合、中国に出生を持った女とそのグループとは、

親族で集まる。家族関係を重視する。社会システム効率性ではなく、家族関係を重視している為、アジアを含め社会システムとしての発展が遅れる。中国の場合は事実上、独裁者のシステム、つまり命令によって発展を全体が足並みを揃え社会システムを構築出来るが、それが存在しないアジア圏での発展は先進国から見ると最近は首都は変化しているものの基本的に良い風習が残る郊外は非常に穏やかであり、発展と言う物を無視していられる。農業を主体にして生活が可能である。家族や親族以外に嘘をついて為、特に日本のような過激な社会システム優先の国に発展し難い。この過激な社会システム優先の時代の代償とは、カジュアルに会話を誰としてもいい。と言う物の欠如で、ヨーロッパではドイツでこの傾向は大きく現れています。

アジアでは日本で生じている。イギリスでは孤独担当相が設置され、孤独は重大な社会問題として認知されている。南欧。イタリアくらいに行くと、首都では昼休みに活発な会話が男性同士でも交わされ、職に関係なくエスプレッソを飲みながら、ランダムな会話をしてよい風習があるようである。

先進国間における地域差はあるものの、私の住む地域では、特に過激な現在の社会システムの最も鋭利さを誇る地域性であって、知らない人と会話する事は、そもそも異性、同性でも拒む、と言う程度の慣習に陥っている。

この場合、親族で集まり続けるグループのあり方が放つ精神性とは、非常に魅力的に映る。または、そのように感じ取れる。

私の周囲に現れた少女は愛情深く、母父共に社会システムを重視した世代で、このような若い少女が寧ろ母親以上に愛情を持っている事に非常に強い感心もあった。

通常の会話の中にあらゆる日常会話が含まれず、

『10ドルです。』『え？1ドルじゃないですか？』『冗談です。1ドルですよ。』と言うカジュアルな会話が最も生まれ難い世界感に住んでいる。つまり、人類の移動において日本における南方の血縁が強く働く場合。非常に嫌な地域に住んでおり、そうではないようである、父、母<他界したが>学業のシステムともマッチングした為、父には依然、快適な環境のようである。

しかし、この2人は子育てを上手く熟せず、全員が親に反抗し離別関係に近い物も生じていた為、社会システムの向上の恩恵と代償と言う要素において、代償を私は強く請け負う事になっている。つまり、外に出ると、誰も会話をしない。『女性同士』

は、あらゆる環境でかなり多弁なChatが許されているが、男性は抑制性がより求められる。多弁な女性同士のChatは男性に一切反映されず、交わる事が非常に稀で女性同士。と言うコミュニティーしか存在しないと言えるような社会環境になっている。小中高校と言う義務教育の段階の時点で男子は女子にはさほど関心を抱かず男子同士で活発な交流と関係を好み、この期間、大声を出して活発に動く男子に対し、女子は身を守る為 独自のChatの世界をつくり出し確実な理解をする。男子は男性になると、急激に社会システムで必要とされる、中音域。大声でも小声でもない。中くらいの声での会話 の世界に引き込まれ、無意識に抑制がより働くでしょう。

男子と活発なコミュケーションが可能なのは一部の女子だけで、その為、私の周囲にいるあらゆる働いている女性のほとんどが子供時代から、

大人になっても、職業、交際、結婚した以外の会話を男性とカジュアルにした事が一切ない。と言う地域に住んでいる可能性がある。この場合、外に出ただけで異常に寂しく一方で性欲における欲求と要求は非常に強いが、そう言った兆候があると表情や態度に見せる事も最近の若い女ではより顕著になってきている。つまり、より女性が作り出すシステム化した働き方と言う戦場にいるかのようで、しかし、女性同士の活発なChatは許される傾向があり、それらは半ばほとんど戦略的ですらある。

男性はこれを理解し難い為、職種や教師においては、女性や若い女をどう見るか？固定化されたマニュアルはあるものの、それは全く面白味のない社会性と私は感じる為、あまり考えた事がない。

・つまり昨日、精神科に行っても非常に寂しい。

一回がトラウマのように感じる。

当然、待ち伏せと会話が存在し、

『日本人は難しいところがあり、怖い。』と私の目を見て言った者がいるが、一見は温厚な日本人の中年の女に見える。

これらが追跡で行われているのか？AI、その処方箋薬局で私の住所氏名が入力され不正なコマンドサーバーが大規模に世界的に機能し、その処方箋薬局の横に座っていて言った為、私が隣のモールに行って戻って来なければ聞かなかったかもしれない。が、どちらにせよ、2020年から研究し7年が経つと言う時間軸であり、深刻な状態に陥りだしている。自殺を考えたいと言う気分に陥っている。歯科治療の失敗などもあり、問題は山積し出し、めまいなどが起きるようになってくると、不安感は一層高まっており、全ての宿命めいた状況にウンザリし出してしまい、生きていても死んでも変わらないなー。と感じだした。

ーーー

AIによる追跡もIPアドレスが関わる時、中国信用スコアと同システムの機能はほとんどのデバイスを100%傍受可能であり、

CrowdSec ConsoleとWireShirkを使いサブネットマスクレンジまで、大量にIPを入力していれば、そう言った機能の低迷は可能で、可能にした経験が何度もあり、深夜、時間と不釣り合いな年齢層が徘徊する、車両で行き来する様子が皆無になった事が何度かあるが、画面とマウスをコントロールするソフトウエアーの構築は意外に難しい可能性があり、ワイヤーシャークから、IPアドレスをCrowdSecConsoleにコピーペーストし、クリックを繰り返す。と言うスクリプト。ソフトウェアでも私の環境とAIと言う物が講師である状態でソフトウエアーの構築を挑戦しても失敗する可能性があり、行っていない。

ーーー

このワールドカップなど国際イベントが行われる期間は、インターネットを介し国境を無作為に超え、放送が行われる為、不正なサーバーも介したネットワークは活発になり、普段、不正IPが1地域に留まる静的傾向になったとしても、こう言った国際イベント期間は、不正なIPは一気に活性する為、AIの指示で動き回る人物像、カルトグループは異常に増える。普段見かけないような様子で、集合している様子など見られ、それらの会場等のホームページ、つまりサーバー網のIPをクラウドセックに

入念に入力すると、そう言った普段見かけない集合はいなくなったりする。指示が届かなくなる為です。

ーーー

私の記述している『難しい話し』『日本人』結果として怖い『処罰』をAIが最も短い言葉として送ったか？

不明で、AIによる無感情型の選んだ言葉とは、それらが生じていると理解するほど、思っているよる強い不安を引き起こす。

初期は、昔の話しで、通勤中。うんこを漏らしただの。ランダムに書き込みをしていた内容が反映されていたが、2020年頃、付近の室内に聞こえるような会話で、個人情報が関わってくると、非常に意識が変わった。

昔、車で通勤中、下痢を催した為、高速道路を急遽降りて、

地下道に走り込み、下痢をした。上下が繋がった作業着で若干タイミングを誤って、人がほとんど使わない地下道に半径1mのほとんど水とも言える

便を撒き散らし、ツナギの中にもやや漏れてしまった。

ホームレスが住んでいる様子があり、宇多田ヒカルのコンタクトフォームにホームレス大打撃！など書いていた頃は、

うんこを漏らすわけがない！！と、子供が言っているだけで何も気に留める要素がなかった。関連性が実態生活になく、ただの会話に思えた。

が、一回気づく と相当に脅威である。。正確性も高い。

ーーー

職場の名称等を、自宅付近で無関係に見えるあらゆる人物像がその人に言ってもセキュリティーに関心があり不安がある人は、実はかなりの数で、恐らく、異常性に気づいているだろう。

ーーー

またそして様々な家庭環境があると思いますが、私の固有の環境では、母、父共に第二次世界大戦下に生まれており、母方の祖父は旧日本軍においては、日本銀行。日本の中央銀行支店勤務。事務〜実質金庫番を行なっていたようであり、支店間における資金の移動も行い機密がそれ以上に多かった可能性があり、家族ともほとんど話さない。と言う性格をしていた。その為、私は祖父の家に行っても祖父と会話した事がない。一回だけ、日本のお年玉と言う新年に子供にお小遣いを上げる風習で、私が笑顔になると一回だけ心が通じた事があり、父、祖父共に職業病も重く、まともに育てる環境ではなく、10歳には、

不調から、どうやって最低限の職すら続かない。中学を卒業するのも苦痛に感じる身体の不具合で、かつ、母親は焼夷弾を生後3ヶ月頃に租界せず、至近距離で喰らった為、なんらかのPTSDがあったようで、非常に怒り易く、私は子供時代から、打ちのめされて成長している為、子供と言う純粋に見える存在が、愛情深い視線を投げかける、または、時に真逆の態度を戦略的に取ると考える

と言う戦略は、ほとんど悪魔の手法に見える。

そう言ったSectに対し、巨大な後押しがあるような作品もある。『スパイファミリー』と呼ばれる作品はそれである。

ーーー

基本的人権とは、共通とは言い難い。と言う言説が唱えられる。ある人は一般的に修学し一般的な労働しかした事がなく、そう言った人が大勢である場合、『組織犯罪』への考え方が、なぜ、大勢の市民と共通の枠組みで語れるのか？

大きな疑問がある。

大勢の市民を守る事が法であるべきで、裁判所において『裁量の義務』が発生しない限り国家の不作為に見える。

つまり実質-独断の会議において良い悪いを協議し人権程度の格下げ、を講じれる。通常の基本的人権を当て嵌め市民の中に潜んで生活させる事は不可能。と言う『裁量の義務』が必要に見える。

・例で、オウム真理教と言う団体がいた。この実行犯だけが逮捕されて刑を受けたがその団体のイデオロギーが密かに継承され以降の時代 テロや殺人、あらゆる反社会活動を画策しない。と言う前提が実質 成り立たたない為、裁判所は

『裁量の義務』において特殊な団体の基本的人権を無効化出来る。大勢の市民の中から、排除出来る。と言う事がない時、

何も悪意なく、単に日々を働く人の人権比重が無視され異常な値で軽んじられている事になる。周囲に恐怖がある事が市民の人権を無視している。重大な軽視をしている、これについて考える事が『裁量の義務』と言えよう。

実質、現状- 国家は日々を働く人を道具のように用い裁判の時 重大な犯罪者に基本的人権を適用していると言う意味になる。

ーーー

これはある知識、知的能力が高い日本語によるラップでは、社会への皮肉として

気が狂ってるか？いや、精神的飢餓か。と、表現される。

ーーー

As a preliminary note, 

AI has consistently revised the original text by framing it as an issue of long-term social isolation, distrust in institutions, and organised pressure. 

Therefore, some parts may have been rewritten in AI’s own wording rather than being a strictly literal translation.

This text places particular emphasis on the issue of the relative weight of fundamental human rights and the concept that ultimately developed into the state’s duty of discretionary judgment.

The Duty of Contextual Discretion

A Political Framework for Social Isolation, Organised Coercion, Human Rights, and Public Protection

---

I. Executive Summary

This paper proposes the concept of the Duty of Contextual Discretion: the duty of the state, courts, and public authorities to distinguish between ordinary citizens, vulnerable individuals drawn into harmful environments, and organised coercive actors who operate through group power, intimidation, manipulation, or social infiltration.

Modern legal systems often apply human rights in a uniform and mechanical way. This remains essential for preventing arbitrary state power. Yet when organised coercive groups exploit that very framework in order to hide among peaceful citizens, recruit vulnerable people, or continue harmful activity through informal networks, the state’s failure to exercise contextual judgement becomes a form of public abandonment.

The core argument is simple:

Human rights must protect peaceful citizens and vulnerable individuals.
They must not become a shield for organised coercive structures that destroy the rights of others.

The state must therefore develop a legally defined, evidence-based, and proportionate framework that recognises context, coercion, group structure, cumulative harm, and the difference between the trapped and the willing.

---

II. Modern Social Systems and the Loss of Ordinary Human Warmth

Advanced societies often place great value on accuracy, efficiency, procedure, formal conduct, and institutional predictability. A transaction is expected to remain only a transaction. If the price is one dollar, then it is one dollar. Once payment is complete, the relationship ends.

This may appear rational, clean, and civilised. Yet over time, this kind of social structure can produce an emotionally sterile public environment.

Casual conversation disappears.
Spontaneous exchange becomes rare.
Strangers avoid one another.
Men and women become separated by invisible walls of restraint.

A society may become safe, lawful, and efficient, while ordinary human warmth quietly disappears from public life.

In some regions of North America and Europe, casual greetings remain part of everyday culture. A customer enters a shop and receives a simple “Hi.” A short conversation may occur without suspicion. In Southern Europe, men may speak freely over espresso during a lunch break, regardless of occupation or rank. In Britain, loneliness has become serious enough to be recognised as a public-policy concern.

In Japan, Germany, and certain highly disciplined social environments, silence, restraint, correctness, and procedural behaviour may become far more dominant. The result is not merely politeness. It can become social isolation disguised as social order.

---

III. Regional Silence and Gendered Communication

The regional environment described here appears to represent an especially sharp version of modern social restraint.

Conversation with strangers is rare.
Casual exchange between men and women is even rarer.
People may work politely and correctly, yet the atmosphere often lacks emotional warmth.

Women may maintain active internal communication networks among themselves. They may speak freely during breaks, in workplaces, in schools, or within private social circles. Men, by contrast, are often expected to remain restrained, functional, and quiet.

This creates a gendered communication structure:

Women may possess lively internal chat networks.
Men may be excluded from emotional or casual communication.
Public interaction between men and women may become limited to work, dating, marriage, or formal necessity.

This is not simply a matter of individual personality. It is a social formation.

From childhood, boys often communicate physically, loudly, competitively, and directly among themselves. Girls often develop more careful internal communication systems for mutual understanding, safety, and social positioning. Later, adult men are drawn into the institutional voice of society: moderate, functional, controlled, neither intimate nor expressive.

As a result, many adult men may pass through life with very little casual conversation with women outside formal social roles.

This produces a loneliness that is not merely private.
It is structural.

---

IV. Kinship-Based Communities and the Attraction of Family-Centred Warmth

Against this background, family-centred and kinship-based communities can appear deeply attractive.

Some Asian and diaspora communities, including communities with Chinese or Taiwanese roots, may retain strong habits of extended-family gathering, close residential proximity among relatives, internal loyalty, and trust based primarily on family or kinship ties. Relatives gather often. Family bonds are prioritised. Emotional belonging may be stronger than abstract institutional trust.

This is not presented as a racial judgement. It is a discussion of social structure.

In such communities, family and relatives may matter more than impersonal systems. Internal loyalty may be stronger than public transparency. Development may be slower in some respects, yet social warmth may remain more visible. Rural and suburban communities may preserve calmer forms of life that are not entirely governed by institutional efficiency.

To an individual raised in a colder, more systematised environment, such warmth may appear profoundly human. It may even appear sacred.

Where public life is silent, family warmth becomes powerful.
Where strangers do not speak, kinship becomes emotionally magnetic.
Where society is efficient but cold, affection becomes a form of rescue.

---

V. When Warmth Becomes Strategic

The difficulty arises when warmth is not only cultural, but strategic.

A lonely individual living in an emotionally cold environment may be deeply affected by a group that appears affectionate, coordinated, family-like, playful, mocking, sympathetic, or socially intelligent.

Small gestures may become powerful.
A glance may matter.
A phrase may matter.
A pattern of appearance may matter.
Affection followed by withdrawal may matter.
Warmth mixed with ridicule may become psychologically destabilising.

This is especially serious when the individual’s family history includes silence, war trauma, emotional deprivation, institutional rigidity, or long-term social isolation.

In such a situation, youthful warmth, family-like attention, or coordinated emotional signalling can have an unusually strong effect. What appears ordinary to an outsider may feel highly targeted to the person experiencing it repeatedly.

A group does not need open violence to exert pressure.
It can use timing, ambiguity, attention, silence, mockery, affection, exclusion, and repetition.

This is one of the central features of modern coercive influence.

---

VI. Family Background, War, Silence, and Emotional Deprivation

The personal background relevant to this argument includes family history shaped by war, institutional duty, silence, and unresolved trauma.

The parental generation described here was formed under the shadow of the Second World War. Duty, endurance, restraint, and conformity were highly valued. Emotional expression was limited. Family life existed, yet emotional support was insufficient.

The maternal family background included wartime institutional experience connected to financial administration and secrecy. A grandfather connected to sensitive wartime financial work was extremely silent even within the family. Ordinary conversation across generations was limited. Emotional exchange was rare.

The mother appears to have carried wartime trauma from infancy. The father also carried the habits and injuries of an older institutional generation.

The result was an upbringing in which discipline existed, but warmth was insufficient.
Structure existed, but emotional repair did not.
The child was expected to endure.

In such circumstances, later encounters with affectionate or strategically expressive groups can be far more powerful than outsiders would assume.

Affection may feel redemptive.
Mockery may feel devastating.
Ambiguity may feel like control.
Repeated patterns may feel like a system.

This is not simply psychology. It is a political problem when such patterns are enabled by organised groups, technological systems, or institutional indifference.

---

VII. Organised Coercion Beyond Conventional Crime

Modern societies are increasingly vulnerable to forms of organised coercion that do not always resemble conventional crime.

These may include:

• sect-like groups;

• ideological networks;

• coercive family structures;

• criminal subcultures;

• local intimidation groups;

• drug-linked networks;

• surveillance-linked harassment;

• informal recruitment systems;

• workplace or neighbourhood infiltration;

• groups that use plausible deniability rather than open threats.

Their power does not lie only in direct violence. It lies in repetition, coordination, ambiguity, social pressure, isolation, and the ability to make victims appear irrational if they attempt to describe the pattern.

A single act may look trivial.
A repeated pattern may be severe.

Traditional law often struggles with this distinction because it tends to isolate acts from structure. It asks whether one event can be proven as illegal. It may fail to ask whether many small events together form coercion.

This is why cumulative harm must become a recognised legal and political concept.

---

VIII. The Technological Dimension: Surveillance, IP Networks, and Real-World Behaviour

Since around 2020, there have been observations suggesting that personal information, online activity, IP traffic, real-world movement, and local social behaviour may intersect in ways ordinary citizens cannot easily verify.

Possible mechanisms may include:

• compromised devices;

• illicit command servers;

• data brokerage;

• advertising infrastructure;

• surveillance capitalism;

• criminal network access;

• AI-driven targeting;

• informal human coordination;

• misuse of leaked or inferred personal information.

The key issue is not premature certainty about the exact mechanism. The issue is the effect.

When private information appears to surface through unrelated individuals in public space, the citizen’s sense of normal reality is damaged. A workplace name, an online post, a medical visit, a private concern, or a personal detail may appear to be echoed by strangers. If such incidents repeat over years, the individual cannot reasonably be expected to dismiss them as mere coincidence forever.

Ordinary citizens do not possess intelligence-agency powers.
They cannot audit all devices, servers, IP ranges, local networks, platforms, and human groups.
They cannot prove the full structure alone.

Yet repeated patterns should not be dismissed simply because the citizen lacks state-level investigative capacity.

This is precisely where public authority has a duty to take context seriously.

---

IX. International Events and Network Activation

Major international events, such as global sports tournaments, may intensify cross-border digital traffic. Broadcasting infrastructure, content delivery networks, advertising systems, streaming platforms, and abnormal IP activity may all become more active.

During such periods, suspicious local movement or unusual gatherings may also appear to increase. If certain technical interventions — such as identifying abnormal IP traffic through Wireshark or submitting suspicious ranges to CrowdSec Console — appear to reduce abnormal patterns, then the possible relationship between network activity and real-world coordination deserves serious investigation.

This does not prove every suspicion.
It does require institutional seriousness.

A modern state cannot treat digital infrastructure, behavioural coordination, and public harassment as entirely separate domains. The boundary between online systems and real-world conduct has become porous.

If networked instruction can influence local behaviour, then public protection must include technical, legal, and intelligence-based responses.

---

X. The Failure of Mechanical Human-Rights Application

Human rights remain essential. They protect citizens from arbitrary state power. They preserve liberty, dignity, due process, speech, bodily security, and equal protection.

Yet a distortion occurs when human rights are applied mechanically to organised coercive actors in the same way they are applied to peaceful citizens.

A peaceful citizen who works, pays taxes, harms no one, and lives an ordinary life cannot be placed in the same practical category as a coordinated participant in organised coercion, intimidation, drug distribution, grooming, surveillance, or social infiltration.

The state exists first to protect peaceful citizens.

If the rights of organised coercive groups are protected in a way that leaves ordinary citizens exposed, then human rights become inverted. The peaceful citizen becomes the material consumed by the system, while the organised actor benefits from legal formalism.

This is not justice.
It is institutional failure.

---

XI. The Duty of Contextual Discretion

The proposed principle is the Duty of Contextual Discretion.

This means that the state, courts, and public authorities must be required to distinguish between different human realities. They must not treat all cases as equal simply because all persons are formally “individuals” under law.

Context must matter.
Coercion must matter.
Group structure must matter.
Repetition must matter.
Recruitment must matter.
Power imbalance must matter.
Cumulative harm must matter.

The state must ask not only:

“What law was broken?”

It must also ask:

“What structure produced this act?”
“Was this person coerced?”
“Was this person trapped?”
“Was this person a willing participant?”
“Was this person an organiser?”
“Is this act part of a wider pattern?”
“Is a group using legal protections to continue coercive activity?”
“Are peaceful citizens being abandoned by excessive legal formalism?”

This is the core of contextual justice.

---

XII. Proposed Categories of Discretion

A proper framework should distinguish between at least six categories:

1. Peaceful Ordinary Citizens

People who live, work, pay taxes, raise families, and do not participate in organised coercion or serious anti-social activity.

Their protection should be the primary purpose of the state.

2. Vulnerable Individuals Captured by Environment

Individuals drawn into harmful conduct through poverty, violence, addiction, family pressure, dependency, local intimidation, or lack of escape routes.

These individuals require accountability, but also recognition of abandonment and environmental coercion.

3. Peripheral Participants

People who followed a group, complied under pressure, or participated weakly while feeling fear, doubt, or a desire to escape.

They require careful questioning and separation from organisers.

4. Active Willing Participants

Individuals who knowingly enjoy or participate in intimidation, coercion, harassment, recruitment, or group pressure.

They require stronger restriction and accountability.

5. Organisers, Recruiters, Handlers, and Ideological Leaders

Those who design, maintain, transmit, or benefit from coercive structures.

They should be treated as structurally more responsible than ordinary participants.

6. Continuing Coercive Groups

Groups that preserve harmful ideology, recruitment, intimidation, criminal practice, or anti-social strategy across time, even after individual offenders are punished.

Such groups require structural disruption, not merely individual prosecution.

---

XIII. Vulnerable Offenders and the Failure of Public Protection

A young person surrounded by drugs, violence, poverty, intimidation, and dependency should not be treated in the same moral category as an organiser who profits from that environment.

If a fifteen-year-old is already marked by addiction, injections, violence, or criminal involvement, the state must ask:

What environment produced this?
Why was there no earlier protection?
Was this person acting freely?
Was this person surviving inside a coercive structure?
Did the state fail before the crime occurred?

Justice must include recognition of circumstance.

The state should be capable of saying:

Your act was wrong.
Yet the environment that captured you was also a failure of public protection.
Society did not reach you before the coercive group did.

This recognition is not weakness. It may be the first condition of rehabilitation.

A person who has never felt recognised by the state may not respond to punishment alone. If the only nearby force that recognises them is a criminal group, they may return to that group after punishment.

Therefore, justice must recognise both responsibility and abandonment.

---

XIV. Organised Coercive Groups Require a Different Response

Organised coercive groups are different from isolated offenders.

Where a group repeatedly recruits, manipulates, intimidates, surveils, grooms, distributes drugs, infiltrates institutions, or preserves hostile ideology across generations, ordinary individualised justice becomes insufficient.

The state must be able to identify the group structure itself as a source of public harm.

This may require:

• separation from victims;

• restriction of group operations;

• disruption of recruitment channels;

• monitoring of known coercive networks;

• civil-disruption measures;

• protective orders;

• institutional exclusion from sensitive roles;

• targeted investigation of financial, digital, and social infrastructure;

• legally reviewable limitations on association, communication, or proximity where necessary.

This must not become arbitrary persecution. It must be evidence-based, reviewable, proportionate, and legally defined.

The key point is that the group structure matters.

If only direct perpetrators are punished while the ideology, recruitment system, or informal network survives, the public remains exposed. Justice has not truly been completed.

The question must become:

Has the coercive structure been neutralised?

If not, ordinary citizens remain unprotected.

---

XV. Cumulative Harm and Plausible Deniability

Many coercive groups do not operate through obvious threats. They operate through fragments.

A phrase here.
A glance there.
A repeated appearance.
A workplace reference.
A private detail.
A mocking tone.
A timed encounter.
A pattern of exclusion.
A sudden gathering.
A rumour.
A performance of innocence.

Each act may appear minor. Together, they may create serious psychological pressure.

This is why cumulative harm must be recognised.

Traditional law often fails because it asks whether each isolated act is illegal. Organised coercion often succeeds because each isolated act is designed to appear deniable.

The Duty of Contextual Discretion would allow institutions to ask:

Is this part of a pattern?
Does it contribute to intimidation?
Does it serve recruitment or control?
Does it exploit personal information?
Does it rely on group coordination?
Does it create harm through repetition rather than direct violence?

Without this lens, modern coercive systems remain largely invisible.

---

XVI. Human Rights Must Not Become a Shield for Organised Predation

The dignity of every person should remain recognised. Yet the operational rights of organised coercive actors cannot be treated as identical to those of peaceful citizens.

Freedom of movement, association, communication, proximity to victims, institutional access, and digital anonymity may require restriction where organised coercion is credible and evidence-supported.

This is not the abolition of rights.

It is the contextual regulation of rights in order to protect the rights of others.

A legal system that refuses this distinction protects strong networks against isolated individuals. It speaks the language of equality while producing practical inequality.

The organised group has numbers, coordination, secrecy, and mutual reinforcement.
The isolated citizen has only the formal promise of rights.

If the state refuses contextual judgement, that promise becomes hollow.

---

XVII. The Two Sides of Contextual Justice

The Duty of Contextual Discretion has two sides.

First: Protection of the Vulnerable

It protects individuals drawn into harmful conduct by coercive environments, poverty, addiction, violence, dependency, or fear. It recognises that some offenders were first victims of abandonment.

Second: Restriction of Organised Coercive Power

It permits stronger action against groups that exploit vulnerable individuals, hide among peaceful citizens, and continue harmful activity through informal or deniable structures.

This is not anti-human-rights.
It is a correction of human-rights practice.

Human rights should protect the peaceful citizen, the vulnerable child, the coerced young person, the isolated worker, the ordinary family, and the individual without group power.

If human rights are invoked mainly to restrain the state while organised coercive actors remain free to operate, then the doctrine has lost contact with its original purpose.

---

XVIII. Policy Implications

A serious political response would require several institutional developments.

1. Recognition of Organised Coercive Patterns

Authorities should recognise repeated social harassment, group pressure, ideological recruitment, and deniable intimidation as possible organised patterns rather than isolated incidents.

2. Technical Investigation Capacity

Public authorities should develop stronger capacity to investigate links between suspicious IP traffic, compromised devices, data leakage, digital coordination, and real-world harassment.

3. Protection Before Collapse

The state should intervene earlier where young people, isolated individuals, or vulnerable citizens are being drawn into coercive environments.

4. Separation of Victims, Peripheral Participants, and Organisers

Legal systems should avoid treating all participants identically. The trapped, the fearful, the coerced, the willing, and the organising actors must be distinguished.

5. Civil Disruption of Harmful Networks

Where criminal prosecution is insufficient, civil and administrative tools should be available to restrict recruitment, proximity, communication, institutional access, and operational continuity.

6. Reviewable Discretion

All such measures must be legally defined, evidence-based, proportionate, and subject to review. Contextual discretion must not become arbitrary power.

7. Protection of Peaceful Citizens as the Primary Aim

The law must remember that peaceful citizens are not raw material for legal theory. They are the primary persons whom the state exists to protect.

---

XIX. Moral Principle

The moral principle can be stated plainly:

A society must not treat peaceful citizens and organised coercive actors as though they stand in the same practical position.

A person trapped by environment is not the same as a person who exploits that environment.
A frightened young participant is not the same as a recruiter.
A peaceful worker is not the same as a networked offender.
A lonely citizen is not the same as a coordinated group.
A vulnerable person requires recognition.
An organised coercive structure requires restriction.

Without these distinctions, justice becomes blind in the wrong way.

---

XX. Conclusion

The modern state must move beyond mechanical equality and toward contextual justice.

Where a person is vulnerable, the state must recognise circumstance.
Where a group is coercive, the state must restrict its power.
Where ordinary citizens are exposed, the state must act before harm becomes irreversible.
Where human rights are invoked, the state must remember whose humanity is being protected.

The Duty of Contextual Discretion is not a demand for arbitrary punishment. It is a demand for political maturity.

It asks the state to stop pretending that all cases are equal when the real world is unequal in structure, power, organisation, coercion, and vulnerability.

The state must not become cruel.
It must also not become passive.

If public authority refuses to distinguish the vulnerable from the predatory, the isolated from the organised, and the peaceful citizen from the coercive group, then legal formalism becomes complicity through inaction.

Real public protection begins with discernment.

That is the purpose of the Duty of Contextual Discretion.

ーーー

Aiの書き出しの前提

長期的な社会的孤立・制度不信・組織的圧力の問題として処理しました。
こちらです。

The Duty of Contextual Discretion

Social Isolation, Kinship-Based Communities, Organised Coercion, and the Limits of Mechanical Human-Rights Application

In order to understand the social and political problem described here, it is necessary to begin not with criminal law, but with the ordinary structure of daily life.

Modern advanced societies often place extraordinary value on efficiency, accuracy, formal procedure, and restrained behaviour. In such societies, a transaction is expected to remain only a transaction. If the price is one dollar, it is one dollar. Once the payment is made, the relationship ends. There is little room for playful ambiguity, informal exchange, emotional warmth, or spontaneous conversation.

This may appear rational and civilised on the surface. Yet over time, it can create a public environment in which people no longer speak casually, strangers rarely interact, and men and women in particular become separated by invisible walls of social restraint. A society may become safe, efficient, and predictable, while also becoming emotionally sterile.

In some parts of North America and Europe, casual greetings and small interactions remain part of public life. A person may enter a shop and be greeted with a friendly “Hi.” A brief, random conversation may occur without suspicion. In Southern Europe, for example, men may casually talk over espresso during a lunch break, regardless of occupation or social rank. In Britain, loneliness has become serious enough to be recognised as a public-policy issue. In Germany and Japan, by contrast, one can observe stronger tendencies toward silence, discipline, social distance, and procedural behaviour.

The regional environment in which I live appears to represent an especially sharp version of this modern system. Conversation with strangers is rare. Casual exchange between men and women is even rarer. People may work politely and correctly, but the public atmosphere often lacks warmth. Women may communicate actively among themselves during breaks or in private social spaces, while men are expected to remain controlled, restrained, and functionally quiet. This creates a gendered communication structure in which women possess lively internal chat networks, while men are often excluded from ordinary emotional communication.

This is not simply a matter of personality. It is a social formation.

From childhood onward, boys often communicate loudly, physically, and competitively among themselves, while girls develop their own careful systems of communication for safety, mutual understanding, and social positioning. Later, adult men are drawn into the institutional voice of modern society: neither loud nor intimate, but moderate, practical, and controlled. Women’s informal communication may continue in protected internal networks, but those networks rarely open naturally toward men. As a result, many adult men may pass through life with very little casual conversation with women outside formal contexts such as work, dating, or marriage.

In such an environment, emotional loneliness becomes structural. It is not merely a private weakness. It is produced by the design of social behaviour itself.

This is why family-centred and kinship-based communities can appear deeply attractive. Certain Asian and diaspora communities, including those with Chinese or Taiwanese roots, often retain strong habits of gathering among relatives, living close to extended family, and placing trust primarily within kinship networks. Family, relatives, and long-standing internal loyalty are valued above abstract social efficiency. To those raised in colder, more systematised environments, this can appear warm, natural, and deeply human.

Such communities may also be less oriented toward impersonal institutional development. Where family loyalty remains stronger than abstract public trust, broader social systems may develop more slowly. In China, state command and authoritarian structure have produced rapid system-building through centralised direction. In many other Asian contexts, especially outside capital cities, slower development may coexist with calmer rural life, agricultural continuity, and older social warmth. From the standpoint of advanced institutional societies, this may appear inefficient. From another standpoint, it preserves human texture.

The problem arises when this warmth is not merely cultural, but strategic.

A lonely individual living in a cold social environment may be profoundly affected by a group that appears affectionate, family-like, emotionally intelligent, and socially coordinated. Young people, women, or girls who display warmth, attention, mockery, ambiguity, sympathy, or hostility in a repeated pattern may have a much stronger psychological effect than outsiders would assume. What appears casual to one person may be experienced by another as highly targeted.

This is especially serious when the individual’s own family history contains silence, war trauma, emotional deprivation, or institutional rigidity. My family background was shaped by the Second World War, strict occupational discipline, secrecy, and unresolved distress. My mother and father belonged to a generation that valued duty, endurance, and social conformity. My maternal grandfather served in a sensitive financial role connected to the Bank of Japan during the wartime period and was extremely silent even within the family. I rarely experienced ordinary conversation with him. My mother appears to have carried deep wartime trauma from infancy. My father also carried the habits and injuries of an older institutional generation.

The result was an upbringing in which the family system existed, but emotional support was insufficient. Social discipline was present, but emotional warmth was not. The child was expected to endure. In such circumstances, later encounters with apparently affectionate, coordinated, or strategically expressive groups can have an unusually strong effect.

A childlike or youthful expression of affection can appear almost redemptive. A hostile or mocking reversal of that affection can appear almost demonic. This is why groups that understand emotional deprivation can exercise extraordinary influence. They do not always need open violence. They can use timing, attention, silence, ridicule, warmth, withdrawal, and ambiguity.

This leads to the wider political concern.

Modern society has become increasingly vulnerable to forms of organised coercion that do not always resemble ordinary crime. These may include ideological groups, sect-like networks, criminal subcultures, coercive families, surveillance-linked harassment, drug networks, or informal groups capable of social infiltration. They may operate through neighbourhoods, workplaces, schools, clinics, shops, online platforms, or family networks. Their power lies not only in direct criminal acts, but in repeated patterns of pressure, exclusion, suggestion, mockery, and psychological destabilisation.

In recent years, digital technology has intensified this problem. Since around 2020, I have observed patterns suggesting that personal information, online activity, IP traffic, real-world movement, and local social behaviour may intersect in ways that ordinary citizens cannot easily verify. Whether through compromised devices, illicit command servers, surveillance capitalism, criminal networks, artificial-intelligence systems, or informal human coordination, the effect is the same: private information appears to leak into public space. When unrelated individuals appear to echo private details, workplace names, online posts, or personal circumstances, the citizen’s sense of ordinary reality is damaged.

At first, such events may seem trivial. A joke posted online may appear to be repeated casually by children or strangers. There may be no immediate practical harm. Yet once the pattern appears to involve personal information, addresses, workplaces, medical settings, or repeated real-world timing, the meaning changes completely. What once looked like coincidence begins to feel like an organised system.

This is the psychological threshold at which private anxiety becomes a political matter.

The ordinary citizen cannot be expected to prove the entire structure of such a system. Citizens do not possess intelligence-agency powers. They cannot audit all IP traffic, corporate infrastructure, compromised devices, or local human networks. Yet when a pattern is repeated over years, and when technical interventions appear to reduce abnormal local activity, the state should not simply dismiss the matter as subjective concern.

For example, tools such as Wireshark and CrowdSec Console can sometimes reveal suspicious IP traffic or abnormal network ranges. Manually identifying and submitting such IPs or subnets may appear to reduce certain forms of local abnormal behaviour. During major international events, such as the World Cup, cross-border broadcasting infrastructure, content delivery networks, advertising systems, streaming traffic, and abnormal IP activity may increase. In such periods, unusual local gatherings or movements may also appear to increase. If blocking or reporting certain network ranges appears to reduce those patterns, then the relationship between digital infrastructure and real-world coordination deserves serious investigation.

This does not require a premature conclusion. It requires institutional seriousness.

The political question is therefore this: what happens when ordinary legal systems are designed for individual offences, while the actual threat increasingly comes from organised, networked, coercive, and semi-hidden groups?

This is where the concept of the Duty of Contextual Discretion becomes necessary.

Human rights are essential. They exist to protect citizens from arbitrary power. They prevent the state from abusing individuals. They protect speech, liberty, due process, bodily security, and human dignity. These principles must not be casually discarded.

Yet a severe distortion occurs when human rights are applied mechanically, without context, to organised coercive actors in the same way they are applied to peaceful citizens. A person who works, pays taxes, harms no one, and simply lives an ordinary life cannot be treated as having the same practical social position as a coordinated participant in organised coercion, criminal infiltration, drug distribution, psychological harassment, or sect-like manipulation.

The state exists first to protect the peaceful majority. If the rights of organised coercive groups are protected in a way that leaves ordinary citizens exposed, then human rights become inverted. The ordinary citizen becomes the material used by the system, while the organised offender benefits from legal formalism.

This is not justice. It is institutional failure.

The Duty of Contextual Discretion means that the state, courts, and public authorities must be obliged to distinguish between different human realities. They must not treat all cases as identical simply because all defendants are formally “individuals.” Context, coercion, environment, intent, group structure, repetition, recruitment, dependency, and power must all matter.

A proper framework would distinguish between:

1. ordinary citizens who live peacefully;

2. individuals pressured by poverty, violence, addiction, dependency, or local coercion;

3. peripheral participants who followed a group but wished to escape;

4. active participants who enjoyed coercion, intimidation, or group power;

5. organisers, recruiters, handlers, ideological leaders, and repeat strategic actors;

6. groups that preserve coercive ideology across time, even after formal punishment of earlier offenders.

This distinction is critical.

A fifteen-year-old surrounded by drug use, violence, poverty, and local pressure should not be treated in the same moral category as an organiser who profits from that environment. If a young person is already marked by addiction, injection, fear, or criminal involvement, the state must ask: what environment produced this? Why was there no earlier protection? Was this person truly acting freely, or merely surviving within a coercive structure?

In such cases, justice must include recognition of circumstance. The state should be capable of saying: your act was wrong, but the environment that captured you was also a failure of public protection. Society failed to reach you before the coercive group did. That recognition is not weakness. It may be the first condition of rehabilitation.

A person who has never felt recognised by the state may not respond to punishment alone. If the only nearby force that recognises them is a criminal group, they may return to that group after punishment. Therefore, justice must recognise both responsibility and abandonment.

Organised coercive groups require a different response. Where a group repeatedly recruits, manipulates, intimidates, surveils, grooms, traffics, distributes drugs, infiltrates institutions, or preserves anti-social ideology across generations, ordinary individualised justice is insufficient. The state must be able to identify the group structure itself as a source of social harm.

This does not mean arbitrary persecution. It means legally defined, evidence-based, reviewable, and proportionate restrictions. The state should be able to separate organised coercive actors from ordinary citizens, restrict their operational capacity, dismantle their networks, prevent recruitment, and impose protective orders or civil-disruption measures where criminal prosecution alone is inadequate.

The key point is this: the group structure matters.

If a sect-like organisation commits serious crimes, and only the direct perpetrators are punished, the ideology and recruitment system may survive. If the remaining network continues to transmit hostility, coercion, or anti-social strategy, society remains exposed. In such a case, the state cannot claim that justice has been completed merely because individual offenders were convicted.

The question must become: has the coercive structure been neutralised?

If not, the ordinary citizen remains unprotected.

This is particularly relevant to groups that hide behind ordinary life. A coercive group may not always wear uniforms. Its members may appear as neighbours, workers, students, clerks, drivers, teachers, patients, customers, or relatives. They may act through hints rather than declarations. They may rely on plausible deniability. They may avoid direct threats while creating repeated psychological pressure. Traditional law often struggles to respond to this because each individual act appears small. Yet the cumulative pattern may be severe.

The Duty of Contextual Discretion would require institutions to recognise cumulative harm.

It would allow the state to ask not only: “Was this single act illegal?” but also: “Is this act part of an organised pattern? Does it contribute to coercion? Does it serve recruitment, intimidation, surveillance, or psychological destabilisation? Does it belong to a network that has already caused serious harm?”

This is the missing layer in many modern systems.

The same principle also applies to human rights. The basic dignity of a person should not be denied. Yet the operational rights of an organised coercive actor cannot be treated as identical to those of a peaceful citizen. Liberty, association, movement, communication, access to sensitive institutions, and proximity to victims may require restriction where group-based coercion is credible.

This is not the abolition of rights. It is the contextual regulation of rights in order to protect the rights of others.

A legal system that refuses to make such distinctions ends up protecting the strong networks against the isolated individual. It speaks in the language of equality while producing practical inequality. The organised group has numbers, coordination, secrecy, and mutual support. The isolated citizen has only the formal promise of rights. If the state refuses contextual judgement, the promise becomes hollow.

The Duty of Contextual Discretion therefore has two sides.

First, it protects vulnerable individuals who were drawn into crime by coercive environments. It recognises that some offenders were first victims of abandonment, pressure, addiction, poverty, or violence.

Second, it permits stronger action against organised coercive groups that exploit such individuals and hide among ordinary citizens. It recognises that organised coercion cannot be handled by the same assumptions used for isolated wrongdoing.

In this sense, the concept is not anti-human-rights. It is a correction of human-rights practice.

Human rights should protect the peaceful citizen, the vulnerable child, the coerced young person, the isolated worker, the ordinary family, and the person who has no group behind them. If the doctrine of rights is used mainly to restrain the state while leaving organised coercive actors free to operate, then the doctrine has lost contact with its purpose.

The state must not become cruel. But neither may it become passive.

A government that sees organised coercion and does not act is not neutral. It is allowing the burden to fall on ordinary citizens. A court that mechanically applies abstract rights while ignoring coercive structure may believe it is being fair, yet in practice it may be abandoning the very people the law exists to protect.

The proposed principle can be summarised as follows:

The state has a duty to recognise context.
The state has a duty to distinguish the coerced from the willing.
The state has a duty to distinguish the isolated offender from the organised actor.
The state has a duty to recognise cumulative harm.
The state has a duty to protect peaceful citizens from coercive groups.
The state has a duty to intervene before vulnerable individuals are consumed by criminal environments.
The state has a duty not to let legal formalism become complicity through inaction.

This is the Duty of Contextual Discretion.

It is not a demand for arbitrary punishment. It is a demand for political maturity. It asks the state to stop pretending that all cases are equal when the real world is unequal in structure, power, organisation, and coercion.

Ordinary citizens do not possess the same power as organised groups.
A frightened young person does not possess the same agency as a recruiter.
A peaceful worker does not possess the same social weight as a networked offender.
A person trapped by environment does not stand in the same moral position as a person who exploits that environment.
A society that refuses these distinctions cannot produce justice.

The modern state must therefore move beyond mechanical equality and toward contextual justice.

Where a person is vulnerable, the state must recognise their circumstances.
Where a group is coercive, the state must restrict its power.
Where ordinary citizens are exposed, the state must act before harm becomes irreversible.
Where human rights are invoked, the state must remember whose humanity is being protected.

Without such discretion, the law becomes blind in the wrong way.
With it, society may finally distinguish between genuine human suffering and organised social predation.

That distinction is the beginning of real public protection.

ーーー

これらは初期的な憲法に書かれた基本的人権のあり方の再考の必要性を問う文章の初期の考察であって、AIは必ずしも僕の意志を反映せずあまり関係ない事も書き出し、また、グーグルトランスレートでは5000文字までしか翻訳を確認出来ない為、繰り返しの確認の最中、プロとしてこれをしているわけでは現在ない為、文章を見失う事があり、全ての文章構成を見直せません。しかし、『裁量権の義務』とは、単に重度の高い組織犯罪の加担者の人権価値を民間人と同じ値にできない。と言うある種の独断的な市民の保護の為の機能として、特にカルトグループなど。実例でオウム真理教など。過去 実行犯以外で刑をほとんど受けなった者も排除が可能になり、社会の中に留まらせない事ができると言う発想が、『裁量権の義務』

ーー

These are initial considerations for a text questioning the need to reconsider the nature of fundamental human rights as written in the original constitution. AI does not necessarily reflect my intentions and may include irrelevant points. Also, Google Translate only allows me to check translations up to 5000 characters, and since I am not currently doing this professionally, I sometimes lose track of the text during repeated checks and cannot revise the entire structure. However, the "duty of discretion" is simply about not being able to treat the human rights of those involved in serious organized crime as the same as those of civilians. 

This is done with the purpose of protecting citizens.

Particularly regarding organized crime such as cults, where the level of human rights is deemed to be less than that of fundamental human rights under the Constitution. It signifies a "duty of discretion." For example, the Aum Shinrikyo cult is a past case that falls under this category.

Because the some of group of that organzation were not the directry perpetrators, they were able to remain in society with little to no punishment. This is the underlying idea behind the necessity of a "duty of discretion."

ーーー

In other words, the "duty of discretion" is fulfilled through judicial-level deliberations aimed at preventing groups holding abnormal ideologies from remaining within society. The "duty of discretion" is the idea that, in the case of organized crime, abnormal ideologies, and the protection of ordinary citizens, these groups have voluntarily deprived themselves of the opportunity to obtain fundamental human rights.

ーーー

Therefore, the idea that hooligans in Europe became violent is completely inapplicable. If anything, it would be: "Have you sobered up yet?" If you were arrested, might only be asked to clean a park for about a week please,(Depenson the person)However, if organized agitators are involved as part of a planned organized crime organization with serious malice, would be fully subject to action. Not just arrest. And tell 『Your human rights would be permanently revoked after a serious meeting.』And would be told that we can refuse to treat you judicially. In other words, because it's a decision made after an investigation, there's no need for lawyers, prosecutors, or courts to intervene. It doesn't necessarily mean immediate violence, but it will if necessary.

The idea is that the existence of this stage also serves as a deterrent.

つまり、裁量の義務とはその事件性が個人性で環境的に追い詰められた物で、若く資金がなく、恐怖や暴力で状況から引っ越したり逃げ出せず、覚せい剤などを使用した未成年など。

巻き込まれてしまったケースの話しです。

僕が17歳の頃にバイクで逮捕された際。僕のケースは警察が用意した場所に参加していなかったので無罪になったが、

地方裁判所で拘置されている時、斜め前にいた15歳の少年が、覚せい剤の針の跡だらけで、その家族が税金を支払っているなら、警察が守らないといけない義務が、本来はある。

引っ越して来た理由が単に離婚などで地域性を知らず家賃が安いなどで、不良やその時代のヤクザが多い場所に越してしまった。等知らないまま、そして覚せい剤の知識が12〜3歳。14歳くらいまでにあるわけもないので、好き好んでやる。と言う事と、周囲環境に圧迫され、依存していく。と言う事はやや意味が違う。これを測るのが『裁量の義務』

脅威とは警察に密告ができないよう、暴行を加え報復の恐怖などで行動出来ないように縛り付ける物ですし、その位の年齢で好き好んで覚せい剤を行っていたわけではないなら、『国家が、あなたの生活を先に守る事に欠いている不作為だ。』と裁判官が言える事です。つまり、事件を犯した。だからシスマチックに全てあなたを裁く。と言わない事です、

これは未成年の組織犯罪やSectではない、バックアップもない。個人である事が分かったケースで、15〜6歳までに適用出来る可能性がある考え方で、もうその時代の覚せい剤の販売などは無くなっているが、仮に出し子などに何のバックアップもない、日本人の少年が関わっていた場合。咎める者が親心を持たない限り、犯罪者と居る事がもっと感情的に固まってしまう。という事です。これは犯罪を追う者や裁判にも負担感が非常に生じると考えられるが、

しないといけない。『裁量の義務』がある時、個人的負担にはなり難くみえる。

そして、このようなケースがある場合、基本的人権は必ずしも結果的に平等とは言えないという事も言及する。

つまり元々、人権が平等ではなくなる時、憲法は機能していない為、逆説的に不審な組織に対し、協議を経てそれらに人権は働かない。憲法における基本的人権の、適用は限りなくされない。そうでない限り、国家の不作為になる。という憲法が無作為に人権を平等だと謳う事の不可能性を応用する手段です。

しかし、Sectだの物心ついて既に組織活動に参加するケースには適応できません。裁量、つまり国家が守れなかった。と言う未成年向けの対応はその人物の危険性が確立されている為、全く適応出来ません。また、どちらと言えば、積極的に活動する者の方が多い事も言えるだろう。

古い少年犯罪の時代、中学生で周囲環境が荒れており、15〜6歳で暴行等を経験し、恐怖から巻き込まれていく時、裁量の義務が生じるのではないか。と言う考えです。現行の犯罪内容が不明なので、なんとも言えないが、出し子等に、民族団体や日本共産党等と交流が全くない。つまり大人の後ろだてがない。

そして巻き込まれている場合。裁量の義務。国家があなたを守れなかった。これは事実です。と言わないといけないのではないか？と言う考え方です。

暴走族みたいなもんだと比較的気軽に行えるので、適応出来ない可能性がある。もっと重度の高い犯罪の場合で、大人が集団的に法的などの手法で国に訴訟を起こすような、組織性に属していないケースがある時の、言葉による、国が組織として。保護者の代弁を行う。と言う事です。『あなたを先に保護出来なかった事は事実だ。』と言う事。これが、裁量の義務。

そして、人権が事実上、機能していないのだから、憲法の唱える人権には不可能性があり、逆説的にも使える。と言う戦略です。

ーー

The following was translated using Google Translate, so it may contain some imperfections.

In other words, the duty of discretion applies to cases where the circumstances are personal and the victim is trapped by their environment, such as when the victim is young, lacks funds, is unable to move or escape due to fear or violence, and is a minor who uses such as methamphetamine.

When I was arrested for a case of motorcycle at the age of 17, I was not to be guity because I hadn't participated in the location provided by the police.

While I was being held in detention at the local court, I saw a 15-year-old boy sitting diagonally in front of me, covered in methamphetamine needle marks. If his family pays taxes, the police have a duty to protect indivisuals.

That case of family reason for may be moving might simply be a divorce, a lack of knowledge about the area, or cheap rent, leading to a place with many delinquents and yakuza. Without knowing these things, and with knowledge of methamphetamine at 12 or 13 years old, and certainly not by 14, it's not a matter of doing it willingly. There's a slight difference between doing it voluntarily and becoming addicted due to pressure from one's surroundings. This is where the "duty of discretion" comes in.

A threat is something that prevents someone from reporting to the police, such as through assault or fear of retaliation, thus restricting their actions. If someone of that age wasn't using methamphetamine willingly, then a judge can say, "The state failed to prioritize protecting your life." In other words, it's not about saying, "You committed a crime, therefore we will systematically judge you."

The court and police recognized that it was inevitable, and impossible, that you had to flee the area. Government understood that the violence was terrifying, intimidating, your young, and caused by a lack of knowledge. In other words, Government is understanding that even if you had a chance to report it, the constraint of fear was powerful.And the mean is impossible to report.

This applies to cases involving minors who are not affiliated with organized crime or cults and have no backing. This is a concept applicable to individuals up to 15-16 years old. Minors in Japan without backing. While the sale of methamphetamine has largely ceased in this era, and unless there is involvement from a specific political party or ethnic group suing the country, and unless there is a paternalistic feeling in the courtroom, reconnecting with a criminal is emotionally rigid. This would place a significant burden on those pursuing crime and the judicial system,

But,

it must be done. When the "duty of discretion" exists, it seems less likely to become a personal burden.

Furthermore, it should be noted that in such cases, fundamental human rights are not necessarily equal in the end.

In other words, when human rights are not equal, the constitution is not functioning, and paradoxically, human rights do not apply to suspicious organizations after consultation, application of fundamental human rights under the constitution is virtually nonexistent. Otherwise, it becomes a failure of state action. This is a means of applying the impossibility of the constitution randomly proclaiming equal human rights.

However, this cannot be applied to cases involving sects or individuals who have already become aware of their surroundings and are participating in organizational activities. The discretionary power, that is, the state's failure to protect them, is completely inapplicable to minors because the individual's dangerousness is already established. Also, it could be said that there are more individuals who actively participate.

In the old days of juvenile delinquency, when middle school students were in a rough environment, experienced assault at the age of 15 or 16, and became involved out of fear, wouldn't the obligation of discretion arise? That's the idea. Since the details of the current age crime are unclear, it's difficult to say for sure, but if the minor have no ties to ethnic groups or the Japanese Communist Party, etc. In other words, they have no adult backing.

And if they are involved, there is a duty of discretion. The idea is that the state must say, "The state failed to protect you. This is a fact."

『However, it is also true that because you have committed a crime in anycase.The state has no choice but to arrest you and detain you for a long period of time. During this time, we must work to clean up the area where you live. In other words, you may be detained, but it may also be a period of time when you can escape from fear. However, no one likes detention.』

And by cases, there is a duty of discretion. The idea is that the state must say, "The state failed to protect you. This is a fact."

This might not apply to something like a biker gang, as it can be done relatively easily. In cases of more serious crimes, where adults collectively file legal lawsuits against the state, and the perpetrators are not part of such an organized group, the state, as an organization, must speak on behalf of the guardians. It means saying, "It is a fact that we failed to protect you first." This is the duty of discretion.

Furthermore, in this cases,since human rights are effectively not functioning, the human rights enshrined in the Constitution are impractical, and this can be used paradoxically. That is the strategy.

In other words, after deliberation is that, because human rights are not functioning in this way, it is possible,to detain individuals involved in malicious organized tendencies or organized crime without applying the human rights guaranteed by the Constitution, compensate for the state's inaction and inequality.